



Minutes  
of  
**60<sup>th</sup> PCC meeting**

**Date: 31.10.2017**  
**Eastern Regional Power Committee**  
**14, Golf Club Road, Tollygunge**  
**Kolkata: 700 033**

# EASTERN REGIONAL POWER COMMITTEE

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## MINUTES OF 60<sup>TH</sup> PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING HELD AT ERPC, KOLKATA ON 24.10.2017 (TUESDAY) AT 11:00 HOURS

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List of participants is enclosed at **Annexure-A**.

### PART – A

#### **ITEM NO. A.1: Confirmation of minutes of 59<sup>th</sup> Protection sub-Committee Meeting held on 20<sup>th</sup> September, 2017 at ERPC, Kolkata.**

The minutes of 59<sup>th</sup> Protection Sub-Committee meeting held on 20.09.17 circulated vide letter dated 22.09.17.

Members may confirm the minutes of 59<sup>th</sup> PCC meeting.

#### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members confirmed the minutes of 59<sup>th</sup> PCC meeting.*

### PART – B

#### **ANALYSIS & DISCUSSION ON GRID INCIDENCES OCCURRED IN SEPTEMBER, 2017**

#### **ITEM NO. B.1: Disturbance at 220 kV Motipur S/s on 05-09-17 at 10:17 hrs**

At 10:17 hrs, 220 KV Motipur- Musahari line tripped on Zone-1, B-Ph , at distance of 36.5KM from Motipur. At the same time, 220KV MTPS-Motipur line was Tripped from MTPS end, 220KV DMTCL-Motipur ckt-1 and 220KV DMTCL-Motipur ckt-2 were tripped from DMTCL end. Due to Tripping of all three incoming power sources total power failure occurred at 220KV Motipur GSS.

Fault clearing time as per PMU data is 1600 ms.

#### **BSPTCL may explain the following:**

- Tripping of 220KV MTPS-Motipur line and 220KV DMTCL-Motipur D/C line
- Delayed fault clearing of 1600 ms

#### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*BSPTCL explained that there was a B-N fault in 220 KV Motipur- Musahari line and the line got tripped from Motipur end on Zone-1, B-Ph. But Musahari end relay failed to identify the fault. As a result the following lines which were connected to sources tripped to clear the fault:*

- 220KV MTPS-Motipur line was Tripped from MTPS end on backup O/C, E/F protection
- 220KV DMTCL-Motipur ckt-1 and 2 were tripped from DMTCL end on backup O/C, E/F protection

*On enquiry, BSPTCL informed that one line of 220kV Motipur-Darbanga D/C line was LILO at 220kV Musahari S/s.*

*PCC felt that the fault in 220 KV Motipur- Musahari line should be cleared from Musahari end. If Musahari end failed to identify the fault, it should be cleared from Darbanga end of 220kV Musahari-Darbanga line on zone 3.*

PCC advised BSPTCL to take the following remedial actions:

- Relay at Musahari end of 220 KV Motipur- Musahari line should be tested
- Darbanga end relay of 220kV Musahari-Darbanga line should be tested
- Motipur end backup O/C, E/F protection of 220kV Motipur-Darbanga line should be enabled and coordinated with adjacent line relays.

**ITEM NO. B.2: Disturbance at 132 kV Lakhisarai S/s on 09-09-17 at 10:42 hrs**

132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai- I tripped at Lakhisarai(PG) end and 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai- II tripped at Lakhisarai(BSPTCL) end. So, there was total power failure at 132/33 KV Lakhisarai GSS.

Relay indications are as follows:

Relay Indication				
Element Name	Local Relay	Remote Relay	Local Indication	Remote Indication
132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-132 KV Lakhisarai(BSPTCL)-1	No relay	distance relay	No irelay indication	distance=29.55 KM, Zone 2, B- phase,If=2.62 KA.
132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-132 KV Lakhisarai(BSPTCL)-2	distance relay	No relay	Distance=10.1 KM, Fault impedence=17.5ohm, Va=80.6 KV, Vb=81.3 KV, Vc=12.3 KV, Ia=2773.4 A, Ib= 458.3 A, Ic=203.3 A,	No irelay indication

132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai- I & II line length is 15 km.

Fault clearing time as per PMU data is 500 ms.

No fault is found during patrolling and line was charged in first attempt.

**Powergrid and BSPTCL may explain the following:**

- Reason for not clearing the fault in 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai- II from Lakhisarai(PG) end

**Deliberation in the meeting**

BSPTCL explained that there was a B-N fault in 132 KV Lakhisarai(B)-Jamaipur line and Lakhisarai(B) end failed to identify the fault because wrong CT polarity. As a result, the following lines got tripped:

- 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai(B) line-I tripped from Lakhisarai(PG) end on zone 2 and only zone 4 pickup observed at Lakhisarai(B) end.
- 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai(B) line-II tripped from Lakhisarai(B) end within 100 ms and zone 2 pickup observed at Lakhisarai(PG) end.

BSPTCL informed that they could not collect the DR of Lakhisarai(B) end of 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai(B) line-II.

BSPTCL added that CT polarity of 132 KV Lakhisarai(B)-Jamaipur line at Lakhisarai(B) end CT has been corrected.

PCC felt that Lakhisarai(B) end of 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai(B) line-II should see the fault in reverse zone and should not trip within 100 ms.

PCC advised BSPTCL to check Lakhisarai(B) end relay of 132 KV Lakhisarai(PG)-Lakhisarai(B) line-II.

**ITEM NO. B.3: Disturbances at 220kV Madhepura on 06-09-17 at 09:52 hrs**

Tripping of 220 kV Purnea - Madhepura D/C on Y-B-N fault at 09:52 hrs resulted power failure at Madhepura , Supaul, Saharsa and Lahan (Nepal load).

Fault clearing time as per PMU data is 100 ms.

Relay indications:

SI.No.	Name of Bay / Line	Time of tripping	Local End Relay Indications	Remote End Relay Indications
1	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-1	09:52 hrs	Z-1, YB phase, 2.2 kms	
2	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-2	09:52 hrs	Z-4, YB phase, 2.23 kms	

Both the lines were patrolled thoroughly but no fault was found.

BSPTCL and Powergrid may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

BSPTCL and Powergrid informed that there was a YB fault in 220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-1 and updated the relay indications as follows:

SI.No.	Name of Bay / Line	Time of tripping	Local End Relay Indications	Remote End Relay Indications
1	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-1	09:52 hrs	Z-1, YB phase, 2.2 kms	Zone 2, YB phase, 100 km
2	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-2	09:52 hrs	Z-4 pickup, YB phase, 2.23 kms	Zone 2, YB phase, 92 km

Powergrid informed that zone 2 time setting at Purnea (PG) end was instantaneous as a result both the lines tripped immediately.

Powergrid added that zone 2 time setting has been revised to 350 ms.

PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid to upload the tripping details in PDMS on line portal immediately after the tripping.

**ITEM NO. B.4: Disturbances at 220kV Madhepura on 17-09-2017 at 18:13 hrs**

At 18:00 Hrs, 220 kV Purnea-Madhepura line I tripped from Madhepura end on B-N fault.

At 18:13 Hrs, 220 kv Purnea-Madhepura line II tripped on Y-B-N fault causing power failure at Madhepura,Supaul,Kataiya, Sonbarsa and Udakishanganj ( Total 140 MW).

Relay indications:

SI.No.	Name of Bay / Line	Time of tripping	Local End Relay Indications	Remote End Relay Indications
1	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-1	18:01 hrs	B,N pick up,z1 trip dist-54.5 km	
2	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-2	18:14 hrs	B,N pick up,z1 trip dist-38.6 km	

Fault clearing time as per PMU data is 100 ms.

During line patrolling it was found that a tree was fallen on conductor due to storm and rain.

BSPTCL and Powergrid may explain.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Powergrid updated the relay indications as follows:*

SI.No.	Name of Bay / Line	Time of tripping	Local End Relay Indications	Remote End Relay Indications
1	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-1	18:01 hrs	B,N pick up,z1 trip dist-54.5 km	B-N, z1 trip dist-50.5 km. Autoreclose successful
2	220KV Madhepura-Purnea PG ckt-2	18:14 hrs	B,N pick up,z1 trip dist-38.6 km	B-Y, z1 trip dist-54.5 km

*BSPTCL informed that a tree was fallen on line 2 due to storm and rain.*

*PCC advised BSPTCL and Powergrid to upload the tripping details in PDMS on line portal immediately after the tripping.*

### **ITEM NO. B.5: Disturbance at 220 kV Hazipur on 07-09-17 at 18:57 hrs**

Tripping of 220 kV Muzaffarpur - Hazipur D/C from Hazipur on operation of Bus bar protection at Hazipur at 18:57 hrs resulted power failure at Hazipur which was radially fed from Muzaffarpur.

No fault was observed in PMU data.

BSPTCL may explain.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*BSPTCL informed that bus bar protection operated at 220kV Hazipur S/s and tripped 220 kV Muzaffarpur - Hazipur D/C line which were connected to Bus-I. As a result total power failed at Hazipur.*

*BSPTCL informed that old EM type Busbar protection relay is installed at 220kV Hazipur S/s.*

*On enquiry, BSPTCL informed that loads were connected to Bus-II and source 220 kV Muzaffarpur - Hazipur D/C lines were connected to Bus-I.*

PCC advised BSPTCL to distribute the source and loads to maintain the reliability of supply in event of one bus failure.

PCC advised BSPTCL to test the bus bar protection relay at 220kV Hazipur.

**ITEM NO. B.6: Disturbance at 400 kV Arambagh S/s on 09-09-17 at 13:47 hrs**

Delayed clearance of Y-N fault of 400 kV Arambag - Kolaghat S/C due to stuck breaker at Arambag end resulted operation bus differential protection at 400 kV bus - II followed by tripping of all feeders and 400/220 kV ICTs connected to bus - II.

Fault clearing time as per PMU data is 300 ms.

**Relay indications:**

Sl. No.	Name of Bay/Line	Local End Relay type/Make And Indications	Remote End Relay type/Make And Indications
1	400 KV KTPP-Arambag	Yellow phase Z1 Fault distance=34.24Km Fault Current=5.685KA 85L/O(5 nos) 186X( 3 nos) 186A,186B.DT	Main -1 B-n Z1fault Fault Dist=28.19Km Fault Current=6.417KA Main-2 Y-n fault loop L-N.Fault Dist.=27.4Km F current=6.573KA 96BB tripp,86G1,86G2,A/R L/O 85 L/O

WBSETCL may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

WBSETCL explained that LBB operated at KTPP Feeder Panel due to stuck breaker at Arambag. All the 400 KV feeders connected to 400 KV Bus-2 Tripped with 400 KV B/C. 400 KV BKTPP, PPSP-1(new PPSP), 315 MVA T-1 & T-3 were running with Bus-1.

**ITEM NO. B.7: Disturbance at 220 kV Siliguri S/s on 16-09-17 at 01:27 hrs**

At 01:27, conductor of 220 KV Binaguri-Siliguri-II snapped at location no. 6, 3 km from Siliguri-II. At same time, LBB operated at 220 KV main Bus of Siliguri resulted in tripping all outgoing elements.

In PMU data, two more voltage dip observed in R phase.

Powergrid may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

Powergrid explained that there was a fault in 220 KV Binaguri-Siliguri-II and LBB protection at Siliguri maloperated and tripped all the elements connected to main bus. LBB protection was activated and given command after 20 msec instead of 200 msec.

Powegrid added that contact of LBB protection has been changed and the issue is resolved.

**ITEM NO. B.8: Disturbance at 220 kV Chuka S/s on 24-09-17 at 00:33 hrs**

Due to three phase fault in 220 kV Chukha - Birpara D/C (during inclement weather condition) at Birpara S/S, 220 kV Chukha Birpara D/C and 220 kV Chukha - Malbase S/C tripped from Birpara end and 220 kV Birpara - Malbase S/C tripped from Malbase end.

Powergrid and DGPC may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*Powergrid informed that 220 kV Chukha - Birpara D/C tripped on R-B-N fault and 220 kV Birpara - Malbase S/C tripped from Malbase end on another fault during inclement weather.*

*Powergrid explained that 220 kV Chukha - Birpara D/C is in lightning prone area. The line is getting tripped due to Insulator failures. Powergrid added that line insulators of part of the line which is belongs to Powergrid have been replaced with polymer insulators. The insulator failures during lightning have been reduced. However, the line is getting tripped due to failure of porcelain insulators in 39.8 km stretch which is belongs to Bhutan.*

*The issue is referred to 138<sup>th</sup> OCC Meeting.*

**ITEM NO. B.9: Disturbance at 220 kV CTPS B S/s on 26-09-17 at 13:25 hrs**

Both the running units at CTPS B tripped due to tripping of bus II at CTPS B. ' 220KV CTPS(B)-CTPS(A)-I, 220KV CTPS-Dhanbad-I & 220KV CTPS-Bokaro-B-D/C also tripped at same time.

No fault was observed in PMU data.

DVC may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*DVC explained the disturbance as follows:*

- There was no fault in the system and LBB protection at 220kV CTPS-B maloperated and tripped all the elements connected to main bus 2.*
- CTPS-Dhanbad Line # 2 (L # 206) was under shutdown from 08.55hrs with both side grounded.*
- Line side Isolator was opened but Main bus # 2 Isolator was remained in closed as the line has previously connected in Bus # 2.*
- At 13:00hrs, DC supply of L # 206 Breaker was made off, LBB relay of Line#206 operated and tripped the elements connected to Main Bus 2.*
- Generator # 7 which was not in bus # 2 tripped some minutes later through condensor failure as all drives powering that condensor was connected to Unit # 8 boards.*

*DVC explained the reason for LBB actuation as follows:*

- As CTPS-Dhanbad Line # 2 (L # 206) was grounded on both sides, circulating primary current through the Protection CT was significant due to induction. Thus LBB relay was continuously getting some current which was greater than the Pick Up level (20%).*
- As soon as the L # 206 CB DC was switched OFF during maintenance work, LBB relay got initiation from 79 lock out relay operation and given trip command Main Bus #2 as per the scheme.*

*DVC informed that the condensor drives of Unit # 7 will be connected to appropriate boards.*

*PCC felt that Bus side isolators may be kept open while taking a line shutdown to avoid such LBB maloperations.*

*PCC opined that 79 lock out relay should not operate while switching off the DC supply to the breaker and advised DVC to review the scheme.*

**ITEM NO. B.10: Disturbance at 400 kV Patna S/s on 15-09-17 at 19:25 hrs**

After tripping of ICT I (500 MVA) due to rebooting of differential relay, other ICT at Patna (315 MVA) also tripped due to overloading resulting total power failure at Sipara and Khagul which was radially fed from Patna.

Powergrid may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*Powergrid informed that huge voltage is appearing across the relay during rebooting due to wrong resistor value. The resistor has been changed and the issue is resolved.*

**ITEM NO. B.11: Preparation of reliability standards for protection system for Indian Power System--NPC**

CEA vide letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> September 2017 informed that CERC in its Order dated 05.08.2015 wrt Petition No. 009/SM/2015 in the matter of following up actions on the recommendations of CAC Sub-Committee on Congestion in Transmission, directed National Reliability Council for Electricity (NRCE) to prepare Standards for Protection System.

NRCE in its 6<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 17th March 2016 had formed a Subgroup for Preparation of the Reliability Standards for Protection system and Communication system for Indian Power System. Five meetings were held by the Subgroup. A draft of Reliability Standards for Protection System for Indian Power System has been prepared.

It is requested to furnish the comments from Eastern Region constituents for finalizing the standard.

*The draft copy of Reliability Standards for Protection System for Indian Power System is enclosed at **Annexure-B11** and also available at ERPC website.*

*All the constituents may go through the draft and send their comments to **erpcprotection@gmail.com** with a copy to **mserpc-power@nic.in**.*

Members may update.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*PCC advised all the constituents to send their comments to **erpcprotection@gmail.com** with a copy to **mserpc-power@nic.in** by 30<sup>th</sup> October 2017.*

## **PART- C:: OTHER ITEMS**

### **FOLLOW-UP OF DECISIONS OF THE PREVIOUS PROTECTION SUB-COMMITTEE MEETING(S)**

**(The status on the follow up actions is to be furnished by respective constituents)**

#### **ITEM NO. C.1: Repeated disturbances at 132 kV Rangit, Kurseong, Melli and Rangpo on 30-08-17 at 05:15 hrs and 31-08-17 at 00:39 hrs**

##### **30-08-17 at 05:15 hrs:**

At 5:15 hrs. 132 KV Siliguri-Kurseong S/C, 132 KV Siliguri Melli S/C and 132 KV Rangit-Rangpo S/C tripped on R-B-N fault. As a result, all running units of Rangit(3 x 20 MW) tripped on over frequency and subsequently,132 KV Rangit-Kurseong S/C and 132 KV Rangit-Sagbari S/C were hand tripped.

##### **31-08-17 at 00:39 hrs**

At 00:39 hrs. 132 KV Siliguri-Kurseong S/C, 132 KV Siliguri Melli S/C and 132 KV Rangit-Rangpo S/C tripped on R-B-N fault. As a result, all running units of Rangit(3 x 20 MW) tripped on over frequency and subsequently,132 KV Rangit-Kurseong S/C and 132 KV Rangit-Sagbari S/C were hand tripped.

*In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, Powergrid informed that fault was in both 132 KV Siliguri-Kurseong S/C and 132 KV Siliguri-Melli S/C lines due to lightening strike as both the lines are in same tower. Both the lines tripped from Siliguri end on zone 1.*

*NHPC informed that Rangit units tripped on over frequency due to non availability of evacuation path.*

*PCC advised Powergrid to send the complete details along with sequence of tripping and DR to ERPC and ERLDC for further analysis.*

Powergrid may update.

#### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*PCC advised Powergrid to send the complete details along with sequence of tripping and DR to ERPC and ERLDC for further analysis.*

#### **ITEM NO. C.2: Multiple elements tripping at 220/132 kV Lalmatia (JUSNL) S/s on 06-02-17 at 16:40 Hrs.**

At 16:40hrs, blasting of 132 kV Y & B phase CTs of 132 kV bus sectionalizer at 220/132kV Lalmatia S/s resulted in following events:

- 132 kV Lalmatia - Kahalgaon and 132 kV Lalmatia - Dumka – II tripped from Lalmatia end on zone IV protection.
- 132 kV Lalmatia -Dumka – I feeder tripped from both end.
- Farakka end of 220 kV Farakka Lalmatia line, remain picked up the fault in zone 1 for 880 ms but no line breaker was tripped.

The relay Indications are as follows:

Time	Name of the element	Relay at Lalmatia	Relay at remote end
16:40 hrs	220 kV Lalmatia - Farakka feeder	Did not trip	R-Y-B phase Z-I started, B phase relay picked at 16:40:28.504 hrs, Y phase relay picked at 16:40:28.664 hrs, R phase relay picked at 16:40:28.905 hrs, F/C 1.5 kA in all three phases. All the relay were in picked condition till the end of time frame captured by NTPC end DR (DR is attached)
	132 kV Lalmatia - KhSTPP feeder	B-N, Z-IV, O/C, IA 0.7kA, IB – 0.9 kA, IC – 3kA, Fault duration 183.8 ms.	Did not trip
	132 kV Lalmatia Dumka – I	E/F	D/P
	132 kV Lalmatia Dumka – II	E/F, Z-IV	Did not trip
	220/132 KV ATR, 132/33 KV ATR – I & II at Lalmatia	E/F protection at Lalmatia	

### Analysis of PMU plots:

- At 16:40 hrs, 4 kV voltage dip observed in all three phases.
- Fault clearance time is 700 ms. Though the voltage fully recovered to pre-fault value after 600 ms of the fault.

In 53<sup>rd</sup> PCC, NTPC informed that 132 kV Y & B phase CTs of 132 kV bus sectionalizer were busted at 220/132kV Lalmatia S/s and Bus bar protection was failed to operate. One 220/132kV ATR at Lalmatia (under NTPC control area) tripped on backup E/F protection other ATR which is under JUSNL control area was failed to clear the fault. As a result, 220kV Lalmatia-Farakka line tripped from Farakka end on directional E/F protection.

JUSNL informed that 132kV Lalmatia-Dumka D/C line and 132kV Lalmatia-Khahalgau S/C line tripped from Lalmatia end on non directional over current protection. The 220/132kV ATR at Lalmatia under their control area also tripped on over current E/F protection.

PCC observed that 220kV Lalmatia-Farakka line tripped from Farakka end after 6 sec which is not acceptable and tripping of 220/132kV ATRs is not clear.

PCC advised the following:

- NTPC should check the reason for non-operation of busbar protection at 132kV Lalmatia S/s.
- NTPC and JUSNL should jointly test the healthiness of the busbar protection at 132kV Lalmatia S/s
- NTPC and JUSNL should place the details of ATR tripping along the relevant DR.
- JUSNL should disable the non-directional over current protection feature in all 132kV lines and enable directional over current protection with proper relay coordination.

PCC advised JUSNL and NTPC to submit the action taken report to ERPC and ERLDC within a week.

In 54<sup>th</sup> PCC, NTPC and JUSNL informed that they will test the healthiness of the busbar protection at 132kV Lalmatia S/s in May 2017.

JUSNL informed they have not yet disabled the non-directional over current protection feature in all 132kV lines.

*In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, JUSNL informed that they have disabled the non-directional over current protection*

feature in all 132kV lines and enabled directional over current protection on 30<sup>th</sup> July 2017.

PCC advised JUSNL and NTPC to comply the other observations and submit the action taken report to ERPC and ERLDC.

NTPC and JUSNL may update.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

NTPC informed that protection equipment and CBs are very old at Lalmatia S/s which are the property of ECL. NTPC added that they are facing difficulty to maintain the Lalmatia S/s and 220kV Farakka-Lalmatia line with such old equipment.

PCC felt that Lalmatia S/s is covered under Farakka islanding scheme and ineffective protection/communication system at Lalmatia will affect successful operation of Farakka islanding scheme.

PCC advised NTPC to submit the healthiness status of protection/communication equipment to ERPC and ERLDC. PCC also advised NTPC to pursue with ECL for further necessary action.

### **ITEM NO. C.3: Station blackouts at 220kV MTPS**

Station Blackout being faced at MTPS due to tripping of 220KV MTPS-Kaffen Ckt-1 & 2 on various reasons. It may be noted that above lines are connected to the grid, while remaining lines emanating from MTPS remain connected in radial mode. Though 220KV MTPS-Motipur Ckt-1 and 220KV MTPS-Ujjiyarpur Ckt-2 has grid connectivity, but these two lines are also most of the times kept on radial mode by SLDC, Patna due to power flow constraints.

Following three incidents Kaffen Ckt-1 & 2 trippings resulted in Station Blackout at KBUNL. This causes not only heavy loss to KBUNL but heavy stress on machines due to sudden power failure. North Bihar area which is connected with the MTPS with 6 Nos. 220KV & 7 Nos. 132KV lines also goes in dark during above period.

- 1. TRIPPING OF 220KV MTPS-KAFFEN CKT-1 & 2 FROM KAFFEN END ON 20.06.2017, 08:42 HRS RESULTING IN UNIT-2 TRIPPING AND THUS STATION BLACKOUT.**
- 2. TRIPPING OF 220KV MTPS-KAFFEN CKT-1 & 2 DUE TO PLCC MALFUNCTION ON 07.05.2017, 14:41 HRS RESULTING IN UNIT-1 TRIPPING AND THUS STATION BLACKOUT.**
- 3. TRIPPING OF 220KV MTPS-KAFFEN CKT-1 & 2 DUE TO PLCC MALFUNCTION ON 18.04.2017, 22:55 HRS RESULTING IN STATION BLACKOUT.**

In 57<sup>th</sup> PCC, Powergrid informed that the relays of 220KV MTPS-Kaffen Ckt-1 & 2 at Kaffen(PG) were not functioning properly. The relays have been replaced with new relays.

Regarding malfunction of PLCC system of 220KV MTPS-Kaffen Ckt-1 & 2, Powergrid informed that BPL make PLCC system has been rectified and now it is in order.

Regarding installation of PLCC system in other 220kV lines, BSPTCL informed that they have given consultancy to Powergrid for installing of OPGW in three 220kV lines.

PCC advised BSPTCL to place their action plan for installation of PLCC system in other transmission lines.

In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, BSPTCL informed that PLCC system for 220kV MTPS-Motiari line is available at site. Clearance from MTPS end is awaited for installation of PLCC system.

BSPTCL may update.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*BSPTCL informed that installation of PLCC system for 220kV MTPS-Motiari line is in progress.*

#### **ITEM NO. C.4: Concerned members may update the latest status.**

##### **1. Disturbance at 220 kV Hatia, Biharsharif and Fatua S/s on 05-06-17 at 20:27 hrs.**

*In 57<sup>th</sup> PCC, PCC recommended the following:*

- *PCC felt that 220/132kV ATRs at 220kV Hatia S/s should not trip for a fault in 220 kV Ranchi – Hatia line-I and advised JUSNL to check the relays of 220/132kV ATRs at 220kV Hatia S/s*
- *220 kV TVNL – Biharsharif S/C line should not trip from TVNL end on zone 2 in this case. PCC advised TVNL to review the zone 2 settings of 220 kV TVNL – Biharsharif S/C line at TVNL end.*

JUSNL and TVNL may update.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*JUSNL informed that they are planning to replace the relays of 220/132kV ATRs at 220kV Hatia S/s. Order has been placed for procurement.*

##### **2. Disturbance at 220 kV Fatua S/s (BSPTCL) on 15-06-17 at 06:23 hrs.**

*In 57<sup>th</sup> PCC, BSPTCL was advised to take the following corrective actions:*

- *CB of 220 kV Sipara - Fatuah S/C line at Fatuah end should be tested.*
- *Non directional over current feature should be disabled for 220 kV Biharsharif - Fatuah – I at Fatua end and backup directional over current protection should be properly coordinated with distance protection.*

*In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, BSPTCL informed the following:*

- *They are planning to test CB of 220 kV Sipara - Fatuah S/C line at Fatuah end and submit the report after testing.*
- *Non directional over current feature has been disabled for 220 kV Biharsharif - Fatuah – I at Fatua end and backup directional over current protection was properly coordinated with distance protection.*
- *CB of 220 kV Biharsharif - Fatuah – II at Fatua end has been tested and found that opening time is higher and they are planning to replace the breaker.*

BSPTCL may update.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*BSPTCL informed that they have tested the CB of 220 kV Sipara - Fatuah S/C line at Fatuah end and the tripping time is 102 ms to 106 ms.*

*BSPTCL added that they are planning to replace the CB.*

##### **3. Disturbance at 220 kV Purnea and Madhepura S/s on 14-08-17 at 08:55 hrs**

*In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, it was felt that 220 KV Purnea(PG)-Madhepura line –II should not trip for a fault in line –I. PCC analyzed both end DRs of 220 KV Purnea(PG)-Madhepura line –I and it was observed that Purnea(PG) end has issued the trip command immediately without any time delay after the fault*

pickup in zone 3.

PCC advised Powergrid to check the relay of 220 KV Purnea(PG)-Madhepura line –I at Purnea(PG) end.

PCC advised BSPTCL to check the healthiness of CB of 220 KV Purnea(PG)-Madhepura line –I at madhepura end.

Powergrid and BSPTCL may update.

#### **Deliberation in the meeting**

PCC advised BSPTCL to comply the observations.

#### **4. Disturbance at 400/132 kV Banka S/s on 21-08-17 at 13:50 hrs**

In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, BSPTCL was advised to check the healthiness of CB of 132 KV Banka-Sultanganj line II at Banka end.

BSPTCL may update.

#### **Deliberation in the meeting**

PCC advised BSPTCL to comply the observations.

#### **ITEM NO. C.5: Repeated pole blocking at HVDC Sasaram**

S. No.	Tripping Date	Tripping Time	Brief Reason/Relay Indication	Restoration Date	Restoration Time	Duration
1	17-07-17	5:41	System failure alarm	17-07-17	6:38	0:57
2	17-07-17	16:35	System failure alarm	17-07-17	17:34	1:00:00
3	20-07-17	8:29	System failure alarm	20-07-17	9:25	0:56
4	31-07-17	18:34	System failure alarm	31-07-17	19:45	1:11:00
5	29-05-17	00:15	System failure alarm	29-05-17	01:24	1:09:00
6	25-04-17	06:03	Auxiliary supply failure	25-04-17	07:14	1:11:00
7	01-04-17	09:15	Tripped due to Valve cooling system problem	01-04-17	12:56	3:41:00
8	11-04-17	23:32	System failure alarm	12-04-17	00:17	0:45:00
9	30-04-17	03:24	Due to tripping of filters on eastern side	30-04-17	16:13	12:49:00
10	12-01-17	13:36	Blocked due to unbalanced auxiliary system	12-01-17	15:06	1:30:00
11	14-01-17	05:03	Tripped due to system failure alarm	14-01-17	08:57	3:54:00
12	10-01-17	13:23	Filter problem at Sasaram	12-01-17	11:24	46:01:00
13	03-01-17	11:00	To take pole in service in HVDC mode	10-01-17	07:42	164:42:00
14	03-12-16	12:15	Converter control protection operated	03-12-16	13:22	1:07:00

15	06-12-16	19:12	Tripped due to CCP east side M1, M2 major alarm and observed sys fail in East side	06-12-16	20:55	1:43:00
16	19-12-16	12:43	Due to tripping of 400 kv Biharshariff-Sasaram-II	19-12-16	13:35	0:52:00
17	05-11-16	04:51	System fail alarm	05-11-16	06:57	2:06:00
18	22-11-16	12:12	CCP Main-2 major alarm	22-11-16	13:35	1:23:00
19	26-11-16	09:36	CB filter bank burst	27-11-16	11:31	25:55:00

Regarding pole block on 25-05-17, there is back up in the station in the following form:

132/33 KV Pusauli	315 MVA ICT-2 tertiary	01 No. DG set of 1500 KVA	Battery available for valve cooling system only. It can provide auxiliary supply for at max 2 minutes.
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In 56<sup>th</sup> PCC, Powergrid was advised to submit the details to ERLDC and ERPC.

In 36<sup>th</sup> TCC, Powergrid informed that pole blocking at HVDC Sasaram system is being initiated on system failure alarm. They have contacted OEM and OEM is also failing to conclude and rectify the issue.

Powergrid added that since the HVDC control system is quite old and it is not operating satisfactorily the HVDC control system at Sasaram needs to be upgraded. Powergrid requested TCC to consider.

TCC felt that Powergrid has not placed any report in the PCC meeting and advised Powergrid to take the issue seriously.

TCC opined that system upgradation needs detailed discussion in lower forums and advised Powergrid to place the details in forthcoming PCC meeting scheduled to be held on 20<sup>th</sup> September 2017.

*In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, Powergrid informed that the issue has been referred to their corporate office and they will submit the report soon.*

Powergrid may update.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Powergrid informed that M/s Alstom has inspected the site and collected all the details. They will submit the report within a month.*

### **ITEM NO. C.6: Implementation of on-line tripping incident reporting system in Protection Database Management System.**

On-line tripping incident reporting system has been implemented in Protection Database Management System (PDMS). As decided in 53<sup>rd</sup> & 54<sup>th</sup> PCC Meetings, details of the tripping incident along with the DR, EL events and other reports can be uploaded through this online portal.

The tripping incident reporting page can be accessed in PDMS through the ERPC protection database website: [www.erpc-protectiondb.in:8185](http://www.erpc-protectiondb.in:8185). The link is also available in ERPC website on right side bar. Training on PDMS including on-line tripping incident reporting was given to all the constituents from 22.05.17 to 24.05.17. Subsequently, login ID and password for access of PDMS

has been issued to the respective members as nominated by the authorities.

ERPC vide letter dated 12<sup>th</sup> July 2017 informed all the constituents to submit the tripping incident report along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files through this on-line portal with immediate effect.

In 57<sup>th</sup> PCC, all the constituents were advised to submit the tripping incident report along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files through this on-line portal.

PCC decided to consider both hard copy and details uploaded in the on-line portal for the month of August, 2017.

PCC decided to consider only the on-line tripping incident report as received in PDMS from 1<sup>st</sup> September, 2017.

In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, all the constituents were advised to send their queries to **mserpc-power@nic.in & eeop.erp@gov.in** if they are facing any problem in uploading the tripping details.

In 36<sup>th</sup> TCC, TCC advised all the constituents to upload the tripping details of a month in networks under respective control area along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files in PDMS on-line portal, otherwise it will be considered as violation of compliance of clause 5.2(r) & 5.9 of IEGC.

In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, PCC advised all the constituents to send their queries to **mserpc-power@nic.in & eeop.erp@gov.in** if they are facing any problem in uploading the tripping details.

Members may comply.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members noted for compliance.*

### **ITEM NO. C.7: Third Party Protection Audit**

#### **1. Status of 1<sup>st</sup> Third Party Protection Audit:**

The compliance status of 1<sup>st</sup> Third Party Protection Audit observations is as follows:

<b>Name of Constituents</b>	<b>Total Observations</b>	<b>Complied</b>	<b>% of Compliance</b>
<b>Powergrid</b>	54*	46	85.19
<b>NTPC</b>	16	14	87.50
<b>NHPC</b>	1	1	100.00
<b>DVC</b>	40	26	65.00
<b>WB</b>	68	27	39.71
<b>Odisha</b>	59	38	64.41
<b>JUSNL</b>	34	16	47.06
<b>BSPTCL</b>	16	5	31.25
<b>IPP (GMR, Sterlite and MPL)</b>	5	5	100.00

*\* Pending observations of Powergrid are related to PLCC problems at other end.*

The substation wise status of compliance are available at ERPC website (Observations include PLCC rectification/activation which needs a comprehensive plan).

Members may update.

## **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members noted for compliance.*

### **2. Schedule for 2<sup>nd</sup> Third Party Protection Audit:**

The latest status of 2<sup>nd</sup> Third Party Protection audit is as follows:

1) Jeerat (PG)	Completed on 15 <sup>th</sup> July 2015
2) Subashgram (PG)	Completed on 16 <sup>th</sup> July 2015
3) Kolaghat TPS (WBPDCCL)-	Completed on 7 <sup>th</sup> August 2015
4) Kharagpur (WBSETCL) 400/220kV -	Completed on 7 <sup>th</sup> August 2015
5) Bidhannagar (WBSETCL) 400 &220kV	Completed on 8 <sup>th</sup> September, 2015
6) Durgapur (PG) 400kV S/s	Completed on 10 <sup>th</sup> September, 2015
7) DSTPS(DVC) 400/220kV	Completed on 9 <sup>th</sup> September, 2015
8) Mejia (DVC) TPS 400/220kV	Completed on 11 <sup>th</sup> September, 2015
9) 400/220/132kV Mendhasal (OPTCL)	Completed on 2 <sup>nd</sup> November, 2015
10) 400/220kV Talcher STPS (NTPC)	Completed on 3 <sup>rd</sup> November, 2015
11) 765/400kV Angul (PG)	Completed on 4 <sup>th</sup> November, 2015
12) 400kV JITPL	Completed on 5 <sup>th</sup> November, 2015
13) 400kV GMR	Completed on 5 <sup>th</sup> November, 2015
14) 400kV Malda (PG)	Completed on 23 <sup>rd</sup> February, 2016
15) 400kV Farakka (NTPC)	Completed on 24 <sup>th</sup> February, 2016
16) 400kV Behrampur(PG)	Completed on 25 <sup>th</sup> February, 2016
17) 400kV Sagardighi (WBPDCCL)	Completed on 25 <sup>th</sup> February, 2016
18) 400kV Bakreswar (WBPDCCL)	Completed on 26 <sup>th</sup> February, 2016
19) 765kV Gaya(PG)	Completed on 1 <sup>st</sup> November, 2016
20) 400kV Biharshariff(PG)	Completed on 3 <sup>rd</sup> November, 2016
21) 220kV Biharshariff(BSPTCL)	Completed on 3 <sup>rd</sup> November, 2016
22) 400kV Maithon (PG)	Completed on 18 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
23) 132kV Gola (DVC)	Completed on 17 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
24) 132kV Barhi (DVC)	Completed on 18 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
25) 132kV Koderma (DVC)	Completed on 18 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
26) 132kV Kumardhubi (DVC)	Completed on 19 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
27) 132kV Ramkanali (DVC)	Completed on 19 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
28) 220kV Ramchandrapur	Completed on 1 <sup>st</sup> June, 2017
29) 400kV Jamshedpur (PG)	Completed on 1 <sup>st</sup> June, 2017
30) 132kV Patherdih (DVC)	Completed on 31 <sup>st</sup> May, 2017
31) 132kV Kalipahari (DVC)	Completed on 30 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
32) 132kV Putki (DVC)	Completed on 31 <sup>st</sup> May, 2017
33) 132kV ASP (DVC)	Completed on 30 <sup>th</sup> May, 2017
34) 132kV Mosabani (DVC)	Completed on 2 <sup>nd</sup> June, 2017
35) 132kV Purulia (DVC)	Completed on 1 <sup>st</sup> June, 2017

It was informed that the third party protection audit observations are available in the ERPC website in important documents.

PCC advised all the constituents to comply the observations at the earliest.

Members may update.

## **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members noted for compliance.*

## **ITEM NO. C.8: Implementation of Protection Database Management System Project.**

ERPC proposal for "Creation & Maintenance of web based protection database management system and desktop based protection calculation tool for Eastern Regional Grid" has been approved by the Ministry of Power for funding from Power System Development Fund (PSDF) vide No-10/1/2014-OM dated 07.03.2016.

In 49<sup>th</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that data collection for West Bengal is in progress and it will be completed by December, 2016.

In 50<sup>th</sup> PCC, It was informed that Software Acceptance Tests are in progress.

In 51<sup>st</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that data collection of Odisha and Jharkhand has been completed. Data collection in West Bengal and Bihar is in progress. Data collection of Eastern Region will be completed by 15<sup>th</sup> February 2017.

PRDC added that software acceptance trails of PSCT phase-I have been completed and phase-II will be done from 19<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> January 2017. Software acceptance trails of web based PDMS system have been completed and observations will be implemented at the earliest.

It was informed that a format for on-line reporting of tripping incidence has been prepared in PDMS and PRDC will present details in next PCC meeting.

In 52<sup>nd</sup> PCC, PRDC explained the format for on-line reporting of tripping incidence.

PCC suggested PRDC to include details of the elements under shutdown before the disturbance. In 53<sup>rd</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that data survey and modeling has been completed and PDMS will be operational by 31<sup>st</sup> March 2017. The login id will be provided soon.

PRDC presented the format for on-line reporting of tripping incidence.

PCC in principle agreed with the format and advised PRDC to include a summery sheet for the each tripping incidence.

In 54<sup>th</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that summery sheet for on-line tripping incidence reporting has been prepared. The PDMS is operational and constituents can access the data. Login credentials were given to all the constituents.

It was decided that a separate meeting will be convened in May 2017 to finalize the procedure for on-line reporting and data updation.

In 55<sup>th</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that collection of relay settings 97 out of 112 substations were completed in Bihar. Rest are in progress.

Pending relay setting file collection of JUSNL substations are in progress. Relay setting file collection of Sikkim substations are pending.

*In 56<sup>th</sup> PCC, PRDC informed that relay setting file collection of BSPTCL and Sikkim substations are in progress.*

*In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, It was informed that a special meeting will be held on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2017 at ERPC, Kolkata for validation of substation/relay data available at PDMS.*

*PCC advised all the constituents to send their representative with all the relevant details.*

*In 36<sup>th</sup> TCC, ERPC Secretariat informed that some relay setting data for protection database is still pending from constituents. The latest status as updated in special meeting on 7<sup>th</sup> September 2017 is given below:*

1. Odisha: 92.77%
2. Jharkhand: 91.34%
3. West Bengal: 92.152%
4. Bihar: 70.617% (Powergrid ER-I data is pending)
5. Sikkim: 92.408%

After detail deliberation, it was decided that all constituents will check and verify their Substation data (relay /SLD/CT/PT etc) as available in PDMS and submit their observations by 30<sup>th</sup> September, 2017 to ERPC positively, otherwise the same would be considered as correct information.

TCC felt that Ministry of Power is funding the project and it would be a gross negligence of ER constituents, if complete relay setting data were not provided for implementation of the project.

TCC advised all the constituents to send the pending relay setting data to ERPC and also to check & verify their respective Substation data (relay data/SLD/CT/PT etc) as available in PDMS regularly and submit their observations as per the decision of 07.09.17.

In 59<sup>th</sup> PCC, Powergrid ER-I informed that they will send the data within a week.

PRDC may update.

### Deliberation in the meeting

It was informed that the data has been received from Powergrid ER-I.

### **ITEM NO. C.9: Non-commissioning of PLCC / OPGW and non-implementation of carrier aided tripping in 220kV and above lines.**

According to CEA technical standard for construction of electric plants and electric lines -Clause 43(4) (c), transmission line of 220 KV and above should have single-phase auto-reclosing facility for improving the availability of the lines. However, from the tripping details attached June-August, 2016 it is evident that the some of 220kV above Inter & Intra-Regional lines do not having auto-reclose facility either at one end or at both ends. Out of these for some of the lines even PLCC/OPGW is not yet installed and carrier aided protection including Autorecloser facility is not yet implemented. Based on the trippings of June- August, 2016 and PMU analysis a list of such lines has been prepared and as given below:

List of line where auto reclose facility is not available(Information based on PMU data analysis)							
S. No	Transmission Lines name	Date of Tripping	Reason of Tripping	Owner Detail		Present Status	
				End-1	End-2	OPGW/PLCC Link available	AR facility functional
10	400KV PATNA-BALIA-II	21.06.16	B-N FAULT	PGCIL	PGCIL		
12	400KV PATNA-BALIA-I	21.06.16	R-N FAULT	PGCIL	PGCIL	PLCC available	
13	<u>220KV BUDIPADAR-KORBA-II</u>	23.06.16	Y-N FAULT	OPTCL	CSEB	PLCC available	will be activated in consultation with Korba
14	400 KV ARAMBAGH - BIDHANNAGAR	02.07.16	Y-N FAULT	WBSET CL	WBSET CL	PLCC available	AR in service but some problem in y-

							ph pole
16	400 KV NEW RANCHI - CHANDWA - I	13.07.16	B-N FAULT	PGCIL	PGCIL	PLCC available	
17	<u>220 KV TSTPP-RENGALI</u>	17.07.16	EARTH FAULT	NTPC	OPTCL		
18	<u>220KV BUDIPADAR-RAIGARH</u>	21.07.16	EARTH FAULT	OPTCL	PGCIL	PLCC defective	
19	400 KV KOLAGHAT-KHARAGPUR	03.08.16	Y-N FAULT	WBPDC L	WBSET CL		
20	<u>220 KV FARAKKA-LALMATIA</u>	03.08.16	B-N FAULT .	NTPC	JUNSL	Yes	Old Relay and not functional. 7-8 months required for auto re-close relay procurement.
21	400 KV PURNEA-MUZAFARPUR-I	03.08.16	R-N FAULT	PGCIL	PGCIL	PLCC available	
23	<u>220 KV MUZAFFARPUR - HAZIPUR - II</u>	10.08.16	B-N FAULT	PGCIL	BSPTCL		Voice established. For carrier required shutdown
24	<u>220 KV ROURKELA - TARKERA-II</u>	11.08.16	B-N FAULT	PGCIL	OPTCL	OPGW available	Expected to install protection coupler by Jan 17
25	<u>220 KV CHANDIL-SANTALDIH</u>	25.08.16	R-N FAULT	JUSNL	WBPDC L	not available	
26	400 KV MPL-RANCHI-II	02.09.16	R-N FAULT	MPL	PGCIL	PLCC available	
27	<u>220 KV BIHARSARIF-TENUGHAT</u>	07.09.16	B-N FAULT	BSPTCL	TVNL		
29	<u>220 KV RAMCHANDRAPUR - CHANDIL</u>	22.09.16	B-N FAULT	JUSNL	JUNSL		
31	400 KV KOLAGHAT - CHAIBASA	28.09.16	B-N FAULT	WBPDC L	PGCIL	PLCC available	

34<sup>th</sup> TCC advised all the respective members to update the above list along with the last tripping status in next PCC meeting.

TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of PLCC of other 220kV and above lines under respective control area.

TCC advised to review the status of above in lower forums report back in next TCC.

Members may update the status.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members noted for compliance.*

**ITEM NO. C.10: Non-commissioning / non-functional status of bus-bar protection at important 220 kV Sub-stations.**

It has been observed that at many 220 kV substations particularly that of STU, bus-bar protection is either not commissioned or non-functional. The non-availability / non-functionality of bus bar protection, results in delayed, multiple and uncoordinated tripping, in the event of a bus fault. This in turn not only results in partial local black out but also jeopardises the security of interconnected national grid as a whole. The matter was also pointed out during the third party protection audit which is being carried out regularly. Constituents are required to meet the audit compliance and commission or made bus –bar protection functional where ever it is not available. A list of such important 220 kV sub-stations as per the first third party audit is placed in the meeting.

*In 34<sup>th</sup> TCC, members updated the status as follows:*

**Bus Bar Protection not available (record as per third party protection audit)**

<b>Bihar</b>				
<b>SI No</b>	<b>Name of Substation</b>	<b>Bus protection status</b>	<b>Date of audit</b>	<b>Present Status</b>
1	220 kV Bodhgaya	Not available	28-Dec-12	<i>Single bus and there is no space available for busbar protection</i>
<b>Jharkhand</b>				
1	220 kV Chandil	Not available	29-Jan-13	<i>LBB available</i>
2	220 kV Tenughat	Not available	12-Apr-13	
<b>DVC</b>				
1	220 kV Jamsedpur	Not available	10-Apr-13	<i>Single bus. Bus bar will be commissioned under PSDF.</i>
<b>West Bengal</b>				
1	220 kV Arambah	Not available	24-Jan-13	<i>Available in alarm mode. Planning to replace with numerical relay</i>
2	220 kV Jeerat	Not available	20-Dec-12	<i>Relays have been received at site. Installation is in progress.</i>

TCC further advised all the constituents to give the latest status of Bus Bar protection of other 220KV S/S under respective control area.

TCC advised to review the status of above in lower forums report back in next TCC.

*58<sup>th</sup> PCC advised DVC to install numerical bus bar protection at 220kV Bokaro, Kalyaneswari, Chandrapura and Durgapur S/s to improve the reliability.*

*In 36<sup>th</sup> TCC, DVC informed that they have already covered the upgradation of busbar protection for 220kV Kalyaneswari and Durgapur in PSDF proposal. They will place their action plan for 220kV Bokaro and Chandrapura in upcoming PCC meeting.*

Members may update.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members noted for compliance.*

## PART- D

### **Item No D.1 Tripping incidences in the month of September, 2017**

Other tripping incidences occurred in the month of September 2017 which needs explanation from constituents of either of the end is given at **Annexure- D1**.

*In 58<sup>th</sup> PCC, ERLDC informed that most of the constituents are not submitting the DR and EL data for single line trippings.*

*PCC advised all the constituents to upload the details along with DR and EL in PDMS on-line portal and referred the issue to TCC for further guidance.*

*In 36<sup>th</sup> TCC, all the constituents were advised to use the PDMS on-line portal for uploading the single line tripping details along with DR (comtrade files), EL and other relevant files for all trippings of August 2017 onwards. Otherwise, it will be considered as violation of compliance of clause 5.2(r) & 5.9 of IEGC.*

Members may discuss.

### **Deliberation in the meeting**

*Members explained the tripping incidences. Updated status is enclosed at **Annexure-D1**.*

### **Item No D.2 Any other issues.**

#### **1. Overvoltage tripping of 400 KV lines from Biharshariff --ERLDC**

Overvoltage tripping of lines and healthy phase voltage rise at Biharshariff PMU during nearby SLG fault have become very frequent. In the month of September and August there are frequent such tripping. There are also some discrepancies like high harmonic content, sudden loss of one phase voltage with other two phase voltage rising even when there is no fault etc. In few cases of SLG fault serious high voltage is captured in Biharshariff PMU and in almost all cases of SLG fault near Biharshariff Voltage rise of other phases is very common suggesting that Z0/Z1 ratio at Biharshariff looking into the fault is very high. List of such tripping are as follows:

400KV PURNEA- BIHARSARIFF-II	NEW	05- 08- 17	13:44	05- 08- 17	20:44	Tripped on O/v from Biharsharif end (Mal-operation, voltage at Biharsharif-410KV).DT received at New Purnea
400KV PURNEA- BIHARSARIFF-II	NEW	11- 08- 17	17:52	11- 08- 17	18:17	DT RECEIVED AT PURNEA END
400KV BIHARSARIFF- LAKHISARAI-II		16- 09- 17	16:11	16- 09- 17	22:01	O/V AT BSF (MAL-OPERATION)
400KV BIHARSARIFF- LAKHISARAI-II		16- 09- 17	22:46	17- 09- 17	2:37	Faulty O/V Relay Oprtd
Disturbance at Biharshariff on 25-09-17 at 09:32 hrs (Serious voltage of healthy phases)						

POWERGRID may explain.

**Deliberation in the meeting**

*ERLDC explained the trippings with a detailed presentation. The presentation is enclosed at **Annexure-D2**. ERLDC informed that the waveform of B-ph voltage of 400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II at 400kV Lakhisarai end is triangular and third harmonic component is significant in the signal.*

*Powergrid informed that line CVT at Lakhisarai end was faulty and disturbing the wave shape. The CVT has been replaced and the issue is resolved.*

*ERLDC informed that 400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II has been tripped on over voltage but no over voltage condition was observed as per PMU data.*

*Powergrid informed that line CVTs at Biharshariff end was faulty. The CVT has been replaced.*

*ERLDC added that they have observed severe voltage rise in healthy phases of 400kV Biharshariff PMU data during single phase to ground faults.*

*PCC advised Powergrid to refer Annexure-D2 and take appropriate action to reduce voltage rise in healthy phases during SLG faults.*

Meeting ended with vote of thanks to the chair.

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**Participants in 60<sup>th</sup> PCC Meeting of ERPC**

Venue: ERPC Conference Room, Kolkata

Time: 11:00 hrs

Date: 24.10.2017 (Tuesday)

Sl No	Name	Designation/ Organization	Contact Number	Email	Signature
1	G. MITRA	ERLDC	9831297392	gopalmitra@posoco	
2	J. G. Rao	ERPC	9547891353	eseb-ccc@yahoo.co.in	
3	Lenin-B	ERPC	8335805823	leninmitc@gmail	
4	S. BANERJEE	ERLDC/posoco	9433041823	surajit.banerjee@posoco.in	
5	S.K. SAHU	POWERGRID/odisha Project.	9078883643	sk.sahu@powergridindia.com	
6	S. MAITI	DVC, S.D.E	898682484	sudipta.maiti@gmail.com	
7	M. K. JANA.	DGM/NTPC. FARAKKA.	9437963403	mkjana@ntpc.co.in	
8	S.K. Rai	Sr. Mgtr (S) NTPC-ERPC	9473400272	skrai02@ntpc.co.in	
9	S. P. RASHI	TEESTA V PS NHPC Ltd.	8170005662	SPRASHI1975@gmail.com	
10	S. K. Das	NHPC, CO Farridabad	9717786721	sdas_ntpc@yahoo.co.in	
11	S.K. MISHRA	DGM (OC) ER-II, NTPC	9438233207	skmishra05@ntpc.co.in	
12	SAIBAL GHOSH	Engineer (ERPC)	8589071079	Saibalghosh0@gmail.com	
13	Raj Pratim Kundu	Sr. Engr.	9903329591	rajpratim@posoco.in	
14	Ashoke Kumar Das	Engineer (ERLDC)	9007059569	ashoke.ju.ee@gmail.com	
15	Neelesh Gupta	PH/Teesta III	9816804522	neellesh.gupta@andritz.com	
16	ARVIND NOBIA	SIC / TEESTA III	9571723462	AKNOBIA@gmail.com	
17	Suddeep Kumar	DY. Mgtr / POWERGRID	9431820338	Suddeepkumar@powergridindia.com	
18	VINOD KR. GUPTA	JEE/JUSNL	9801876504	vinod.somasol@gmail.com	
19	P. P. Jena	AEE / ERPC	9776198991	ppjena.epc@gov.in	
20	Prashant Kumar	AEE / CRITL	7763818080	Prashantkumarsahay@yahoo.com	

"Coming together is a beginning, staying together is progress, and working together is success." - Henry Ford

### Participants in 60<sup>th</sup> PCC Meeting of ERPC

Venue: ERPC Conference Room, Kolkata

Time: 11:00 hrs

Date: 24.10.2017 (Tuesday)

Sl No	Name	Designation/ Organization	Contact Number	Email	Signature
21	DEEPAK KUMAR	AEE, JSNL	7053713703	deepakraj5200@gmail.com	
22	Shrawik Banerjee	SE(E), SLDC, WBSEZ	9434910171	svkbanerjee@yahoo.com	
23	DILIP KR. DAS	Addl. CE CTD	9434910544	cectdwbsetel@gmail.com	
24	SUDIPTA GHOSH	Mgr. (PS)	8336917005	sgdsh04@wbtdel.co.in	
25	P. S. Sahu	CLD, SLDC Odisha	9438907778	ele.pssahu@optel.co.in	
26	P. K. Mishra	GM, SLDC, Odisha	9438907402	ele.pkmishra@sldeorissc.org.in	
27	H.S. Misra	DM(E).OPTCL	9438907368	ele.hsmisra@optcl.co.in	
28	Sanchaiti Deb	Mgr (PS), WBPDCL	8336900950	s.deb@wbpdcl.co.in	
29	Tinkaj Kumar	AEE(E) JUNE	9717284071	tinkajnik@gmail.com	
30	PARTHA GHOSH	DM (AM)/E&S	9434748203	parthaghosh@pw	
31	K. Puruxotham	AEE, BSPTCL	7033091481	puruxotham@gmail.com	
32	A. SEN PRADHAN	SE(E), DVC	9932719986	aditi.senpradhan@dvcelectricity.gov.in	
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## 1. Definitions of Protection System, its Philosophy and aspects related to Protection Coordination

### 1.1 Definitions:

a) **Act**

The Electricity Act, 2003 as amended from time to time.

b) **Auto recloser**

A circuit breaker equipped with a mechanism that can automatically close the breaker after it has been opened due to a fault.

c) **Contingency**

The unexpected failure or outage of a system component, such as a generator, transmission line, circuit breaker, switch or other electrical element.

d) **Corrective Action Plan**

A list of actions and an associated timetable for implementation to remedy a specific problem.

e) **Central Transmission Utility (CTU)**

Any Government company, which the Central Government may notify under subsection (1) of Section 38 of the Act;

f) **Dead time of auto recloser relay**

The time between the auto-reclose scheme being energized and the completion of the circuit to the circuit breaker closing contactor.

g) **Disturbance**

- An unplanned event that produces an abnormal system condition.
- Any perturbation to the electric system.
- The unexpected change in Area Control Error (ACE) that is caused by the sudden failure of generation or
- Interruption of load.

h) **Disturbance Recorder (DR)**

A device provided to record the behaviour of the pre-selected digital and analog values of the system parameters during an Event.

i) **Entity**

A Generating Company including captive generating plant or a transmission licensee including Central Transmission Utility and State Transmission Utility or a distribution licensee or a Bulk Consumer whose electrical plant is connected to the Grid at voltage level 33 kV and above.

j) **Event Logger(EL)**

A device provided to record the chronological sequence of operations, of the relays and other equipment.

**k) Facility**

A set of electrical equipment that operates as a single Grid Element (e.g., a line, a generator, a shunt compensator, transformer, etc.)

**l) Facility Rating**

The maximum or minimum voltage, current, frequency, or real or reactive power flow through a facility that does not violate the applicable equipment rating of any equipment comprising the facility.

**m) Generating Company**

Any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person, which owns or operates or maintains a generating station.

**n) Grid**

The entire inter-connected electric power network of the country.

**o) Grid disturbance**

Tripping of one or more power system elements of the grid like a generator, transmission line, transformer, shunt reactor, series capacitor and Static VAR Compensator, resulting in total failure of supply at a sub-station or loss of integrity of the grid, at the level of transmission system at 220 kV and above (132 kV and above in the case of North-Eastern Region).

**p) Grid incident**

Tripping of one or more power system elements of the grid like a generator, transmission line, transformer, shunt reactor, series capacitor and Static VAR Compensator, which requires re-scheduling of generation or load, without total loss of supply at a sub-station or loss of integrity of the grid at 220 kV and above (132 kV and above in the case of North-Eastern Region).

**q) Grid Standards**

The standards specified by the Authority under clause (d) of the Section 73 of the Act.

**r) Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC) or Grid Code**

These regulations specifying the philosophy and the responsibilities for planning and operation of Indian power system.

**s) Interconnection**

A geographic area in which the operation of Bulk Power System components is synchronized such that the failure of one or more of such components may adversely affect the ability of the operators of other components within the system to maintain Reliable Operation of the Facilities within their control.

- t) Inter State Transmission System (ISTS)**
- Any system for the conveyance of electricity by means of a main transmission line from the territory of one State to another State.
  - The conveyance of electricity across the territory of an intervening State as well as conveyance within the State which is incidental to such inter-state transmission of energy.
  - The transmission of electricity within the territory of State on a system built, owned, operated, maintained or controlled by CTU.
- u) Load Blinder**  
Load blinders are the load encroachment elements used to block the distance relay when there is heavy load in the system to avoid cascading trips in the network.
- v) NLDC**  
The Centre established under sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act.
- w) Power System**  
All aspects of generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity and includes one or more of the following, namely.
- generating stations;
  - transmission or main
  - transmission lines;
  - sub-stations;
  - tie-lines;
  - load despatch activities;
  - mains or distribution mains;
  - electric supply lines;
  - overhead lines;
  - service lines;
  - works.
- x) Reactor**  
An electrical facility specifically designed to absorb Reactive Power.
- y) Reclaim time of auto-reclose relay**  
The time from the making of the closing contacts on the auto-reclose relay to the completion of another circuit within the auto-reclose scheme which will reset the scheme or lock out the scheme or circuit breaker as required.
- z) Regional Power Committee (RPC)**  
A Committee established by resolution by the Central Government for a specific region for facilitating the integrated operation of the power systems in that region.
- aa) Regional Load Despatch Centre (RLDC)**  
The Centre established under sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the Act.

**bb) State Load Despatch Centre (SLDC)**

The Centre established under subsection (1) of Section 31 of the Act.

**cc) Special Protection Scheme**

A scheme designed to detect predetermined System conditions and automatically take corrective actions that may include, but are not limited to, adjusting or tripping generation (MW and MVAR), tripping load, or reconfiguring a System(s).

**dd) Stability Limit**

The maximum power flow possible through some particular point in the system while maintaining stability in the entire system or the part of the system to which the stability limit refers.

**ee) State Transmission Utility (STU)**

The Board or the Government Company specified as such by the State Government under sub-section (1) of Section 39 of the Act.

**ff) Thermal Rating**

The maximum amount of electrical current that a transmission line or electrical facility can conduct over a specified time period before it sustains permanent damage by overheating or before it sags to the point that it violates public safety requirements.

**gg) Transient stability**

The ability of the power system to maintain synchronism when subjected to a severe disturbance such as a short circuit on a transmission line.

**hh) Transmission License**

A License granted under Section 14 of the Act to transmit electricity.

**ii) Transmission Planning Criteria**

The policy, standards and guidelines issued by the CEA for the planning and design of the Transmission system.

**jj) Trickle/ Boost charging of battery**

Trickle charging means charging a fully charged battery under no-load at a rate equal to its self-discharge rate, thus enabling the battery to remain at its fully charged level. A battery under continuous float voltage charging is said to be under float-charging. Boost charging means charging a discharged battery at a high current for short period of time. Boost charge enables the quick charging of depleted batteries.

**Words and expressions used and not defined in these standards but defined in the Act shall have the meaning assigned to them in the Act.**

**1.2 General Philosophy of Protection System:**

There shall be protection philosophy which shall be prepared and adopted by each RPC in coordination with stakeholders in the concerned region in accordance with below mentioned objectives, design criteria and other details. However, protection design in a

particular system may vary depending upon judgment and experience in the broad contours of above protection philosophy. Consideration must also be given to the type of equipment to be protected as well as the importance of this equipment to the system. Further, protection must not be defeated by the failure of a single component:

### **1.2.1 Objectives:**

The basic objectives of any protection schemes should be to:

- (i) Mitigate the effect of short circuit and other abnormal conditions in minimum possible time and area.
- (ii) Indicate the location and type of fault and
- (iii) Provide effective tools to analyze the fault and decide remedial measures.

**1.2.2 Design Criteria:** To accomplish the above objectives, the four design criteria for protection that should be considered are: (i) fault clearing time; (ii) selectivity; (iii) sensitivity and (iv) reliability (dependability and security).

**1.2.2.1 Fault clearing time:** In order to minimize the effect on customers and maintain system stability, fault clearing time shall be as per CEA Grid Standard Regulations 2010.

**1.2.2.2 Selectivity:** To ensure Selectivity, coordination shall be ensured with the adjacent protection schemes including breaker failure, transformer downstream relays, generator protection and station auxiliary protection.

**1.2.2.3 Sensitivity:** To ensure Sensitivity, the settings must be investigated to determine that they will perform correctly for the minimum fault current envisaged in the system, yet remain stable during transients and power swings from which the system can recover.

**1.2.2.4 Reliability:** To ensure Reliability, two independent auxiliary direct current-supplies shall be provided for Main-I and Main-II relays. The Main-I and Main-II relays should be from two different makes or operating with different algorithm. The CB's shall have two independent trip coils and two independent trip circuits. Each protection device should trip at least one of them by independent auxiliary DC- supplies.

**1.2.2.5 Security:** To ensure Security, the protection shouldn't limit the maximum transmission capacity of the element. Distance protection in particular could cause spurious tripping due to specific grid conditions, in case of high load operation. Therefore, any special topologies must be known and considered for protection parameterization. For parallel Over Head Lines it is necessary to consider the rapid increase of load current in the healthy line when the faulty line trips and the protection operation must allow such conditions. The load encroachment detection function of the relays must be used, when the highest distance zone resistance reach conflicts with the maximum transmitted load on the protected element.

## **1.3 Philosophy of Line Protection:**

Transmission circuit construction can be considered in three main categories viz.: Overhead construction, Underground cable construction and Composite (overhead plus underground) construction. The requirements of overhead line and cable protection systems vary greatly, due to the exposure of transmission circuits to a wide variety of environmental hazards and are subjected to the wide variations in the format, usage and construction methodologies of transmission circuits. The type of protection signaling (tele- protection) or data communication systems required to work with the protection systems will also influence protection scheme requirements.

Transmission circuit Main protection is required to provide primary protection for the line and clear all type of faults on it within shortest possible time with reliability, selectivity and sensitivity. Transmission circuit back-up protection shall cater for failure of any main protection system to clear any fault that it is expected to clear. A protection function that offers back-up for most faults may also provide main protection for some fault conditions. Combinations of main and back-up protection systems should be used to address the main and application specific requirements for transmission circuits.

**1.3.1 Design Criteria:** While designing the scheme for protection of transmission lines following criteria shall be included:

- (i) The systems applied must be capable of detecting all types of faults, including maximum expected arc resistance that may occur at any location on the protected line.
- (ii) The protection should be set not to trip under system transient conditions, which are not short circuits. Conversely where the short circuit current is low due to local grid conditions (weak network) or due to high resistance of the arc, this must be taken into consideration to trip the relay by using the most appropriate criterion, without jeopardizing the unwanted tripping during heavy load conditions. Protection relays must allow the maximum possible loadability of the protected equipment, while ensuring the clearing of anticipated faults according to the simulation studies.
- (iii) The design and settings of the transmission line protection systems must be such that, with high probability, operation will not occur for faults external to the line or under non-fault conditions.
- (iv) Settings related to the maximum possible loadability of the protected equipment shall be specified after a suitable load flow study and contingency analysis.

**1.3.2 Reliability Criteria:**

**A. For transmission line having voltages at 220kV and above:** High speed Duplicated Main Protection (Main-I and Main-II) shall be provided and at least one of them being carrier aided non-switched four zone distance protection. The other protection may be a phase segregated current differential (this may require digital communication) or a carrier aided non-switched distance protection.

Wherever Optical Ground Wire (OPGW) or separate optic fibre laid for the Communication is available, Main-I and Main-II protection shall be the line differential protection with distance protection as backup (builtin Main relay or standalone). For very short line (less than 10 km), line differential protection with distance protection as backup (built-in Main relay or standalone) shall be provided mandatorily as Main-I and Main-II.).

In addition to above, following shall also be provided:

- (i) Two stage over-voltage protection. However, in case of 220 kV lines, in cases where system has grown sufficiently or in case of short lines, utilities on their discretion may decide not to provide this protection.
- (ii) Auto reclose relay suitable for 1 ph or 3 ph (with deadline charging and synchro- check facility) reclosure.
- (iii) Sensitive Inverse Definite Minimum Time (IDMT) directional E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay).

Main Protection shall have following features:

- a. The Main-I and Main-II protection shall be numerical relays of different makes or employ different fault detection algorithm.
  - b. Each distance relay shall protect four independent zones (three forward zones and one reverse zone). It shall be provided with carrier aided tripping.
  - c. The relays should have sufficient speed so that they will provide the clearing times as defined in the latest revision of CEA Grid Standards Regulations.
  - d. The Main-I and Main-II relays shall be powered by two separate DC source.
  - e. Both, Main-I and Main-II shall send separate initiation signal to Breaker Failure Relay.
  - f. Internal Directional Earth Fault function shall be set to trip the line in case of high resistance earth faults.
  - g. The Broken Conductor detection shall be used for alarm purpose only.
  - h. The internal overvoltage function shall be used to protect the line against over voltages. The protection shall be set in two stages. The lines emanating from same substation shall be provided with pick-up as well as time grading to avoid concurrent trippings. The overvoltage relay shall have better than 97% drop-off to pick-up ratio (the ratio of the limiting values of the characteristic quantity at which the relay resets and operates).
- B. For transmission line having voltages at 132kV:** There should be at least one carrier aided non-switched four zone distance protection scheme. In addition to this, another non-switched/switched distance scheme or directional over current and earth fault relays should be provided as back up. Main protection should be suitable for single and three phase tripping. Additionally, auto-reclose relay suitable for 1 ph or 3 ph (with dead line charging and synchro-check facility) reclosure shall be provided. In case of both line protections being Distance Protections, IDMT type Directional E/F relay (standalone or as built-in function of Main-I & Main-II relay) shall also be provided additionally.

**1.3.3** Following types of protection scheme may be adopted to deal with faults on the lines:

**1.3.3.1. Distance Protection scheme:** The scheme shall be based on the measuring the impedance parameters of the lines with basic requirements as below:

- a. Each distance relay shall protect four independent zones (three forward zones and one reverse zone). It shall be provided with carrier aided tripping.
- b. Each Distance Relay:
  - i. Shall include power swing detection feature for selectively blocking, as required.
  - ii. Shall include suitable fuse-failure protection to monitor all types of fuse failure and block the protection.
  - iii. Shall include load encroachment prevention feature like Load blinder.
  - iv. Shall include Out of Step trip function.
  - v. Distance relay as Main protection should always be complemented by Directional ground protection to provide protection for high resistive line faults.
  - vi. Shall be capable to protect the series compensated lines from voltage inversion, current inversion phenomenon. Special measures must be taken to guard against these phenomenon.

**1.3.3.2 Line Differential Protection:** The scheme shall be based on the comparing the electrical quantities between input and output of the protected system. Provided that:

- (a) Due to the fact that short lines and/or cables do not have enough electrical length, the current differential relay should always be used.
- (b) For Cables, at least a differential line protection shall be used in order to guarantee fast fault clearing while maintaining security. The reason being that there are many sources of errors associated to other protection principles, especially for ground faults in cables.

The differential protection shall have following requirements:

- (i) Line differential as Main-I with inbuilt Distance Protection shall be installed for all the lines irrespective of length (subject to technical limitations). The inbuilt distance protection feature shall get automatically enabled in case of communication failure observed by the differential relay.
- (ii) The differential relays provided in 220kV and above system must operate in less than 30 ms.
- (iii) The current differential protection should be a reliable type (preferably digital). The protection should be of the segregate phase type, i.e. it should be able to detect the phase in fault and therefore for the case of single line-ground (SLG) faults to trip only the phase in fault (also to establish single phase A/R). The synchronization of the measured values

is done via a communication system. The communication system for differential line protection should be based on fiber optic and any equipment should comply with the IEC 60834.

#### **1.3.4. Auto Reclosing:**

The single phase high speed auto-reclosure (HSAR) at 220 kV level and above shall be implemented, including on lines emanating from generating stations. If 3-phase autoreclosure is adopted in the application of the same on lines emanating from generating stations should be studied and decision taken on case to case basis by respective RPC.

##### **1.3.4.1 AR Function Requirements:**

It shall have the following attributes:

- (i) Have single phase or three phase reclosing facilities.
- (ii) Have a continuously variable single phase dead time.
- (iii) Have continuously variable three phase dead time for three phase reclosing.
- (iv) Have continuously variable reclaim time.
- (v) Incorporate a facility of selecting single phase/three phase/single and three phase auto-reclose and non-auto reclosure modes.
- (vi) Have facilities for selecting check synchronizing or dead line charging features.
- (vii) Be of high speed single shot type
- (viii) Suitable relays for SC and DLC should be included in the overall auto-reclose scheme if three phase reclosing is provided.
- (ix) Should allow sequential reclosing of breakers in one and half breaker or double breaker arrangement.

##### **1.3.4.2. Scheme Special Requirements:**

- (i) Modern numerical relays (IEDs) have AR function as built-in feature. However, it is recommended to use standalone AR relay or AR function of Bay control unit (BCU) for 220kV and above voltage lines. For 132kV lines, AR functions built-in Main distance relay IED can be used.
- (ii) Fast simultaneous tripping of the breakers at both ends of a faulty line is essential for successful auto-reclosing. Therefore, availability of protection signaling equipment is a pre-requisite.
- (iii) Starting and Blocking of Auto-reclose Relays:  
Some protections start auto-reclosing and others block. Protections which start A/R are Main-I and Main-II line protections. Protections which block A/R are:
  - a. Breaker Fail Relay
  - b. Line Reactor Protections
  - c. O/V Protection
  - d. Received Direct Transfer trip signals
  - e. Busbar Protection
  - f. Zone 2/3 of Distance Protection
  - g. Carrier Fail Conditions
  - h. Circuit Breaker Problems.

i. Phase to Phase Distance Trip

When a reclosing relay receives start and block A/R impulse simultaneously, block signal dominates. Similarly, if it receives 'start' for 1-phase fault immediately followed by multi-phase fault the later one dominates over the previous one.

**1.3.4.3 Requirement for Multi breaker Arrangement:**

Following schemes shall be adhered to multi-breaker arrangements of one and half breaker or double breaker arrangement:

- (i) In a multi-Circuit Breaker (C.B.) arrangement one C.B. can be taken out of operation and the line still be kept in service. After a line fault only those C.Bs which were closed before the fault shall be reclosed.
- (ii) In multi-C.B. arrangement it is desirable to have a priority arrangement so as to avoid closing of both the breakers in case of a permanent fault.
- (iii) A natural priority is that the C.B. near the busbar is reclosed first. In case of faults on two lines on both sides of a tie C.B. the tie C.B. is reclosed after the outer C.Bs. The outer C.Bs. do not need a prioritizing with respect to each other.
- (iv) In case of bus bar configuration arrangement having a transfer breaker, a separate auto-reclosure relay for transfer breaker is recommended.

**1.3.4.4 Setting Criteria:**

- (i) Auto reclosing requires a dead time which exceeds the de-ionising time. The circuit voltage is the factor having the predominating influence on the de-ionising time. Single phase dead time of 1.0 sec. is recommended for 765 kV, 400 kV and 220 kV system. For the lines emanating from generating stations single-phase dead time upto 1.5 sec may be adopted.
- (ii) According to IEC 62271-101, a breaker must be capable of withstanding the following operating cycle with full rated breaking current:

O - 0.3 s - CO - 3 min - CO

The recommended operating cycle at 765kV, 400 kV and 220 kV is as per the IEC standard. Therefore, reclaim time of 25 Sec. is recommended.

**1.3.5. Power Swing Blocking and Out of Step (OOS) Function**

Large interconnected systems are more susceptible to Power Swings in comparison to the erstwhile smaller standalone systems. Inter-area Power Swings can be set up even due to some event in far flung locations in the system. During the tenure of such swings, outage of any system element may aggravate the situation and can lead to instability (loss of synchronism). It is hence extremely important that unwanted tripping of transmission elements need to be prevented, under these conditions. Distance protection relays demand special consideration under such a situation, being susceptible to undesirable mis-operation during Power swings which may be recoverable or irrecoverable power swings. Following steps may be adopted to achieve above objective:

### **A. Block all Zones except Zone-I**

This application applies a blocking signal to the higher impedance zones of distance relay and allows Zone 1 to trip if the swing enters its operating characteristic. Breaker application is also a consideration when tripping during a power swing. A subset of this application is to block the Zone 2 and higher impedance zones for a preset time (Unblock time delay) and allow a trip if the detection relays do not reset.

In this application, if the swing enters Zone 1, a trip is issued, assuming that the swing impedance entering the Zone-1 characteristic is indicative of loss of synchronism. However, a major disadvantage associated with this philosophy is that indiscriminate line tripping can take place, even for recoverable power swings and risk of damage to breaker.

### **B. Block All Zones and Trip with Out of Step (OOS) Function**

This application applies a blocking signal to all distance relay zones and order tripping if the power swing is unstable using the OOS function (function built in modern distance relays or as a standalone relay). This application is the recommended approach since a controlled separation of the power system can be achieved at preselected network locations. Tripping after the swing is well past the 180-degree position is the recommended option from CB operation point of view.

Normally relay is having Power Swing Un-block timer which unblocks on very slow power swing condition (when impedance locus stays within a zone for a long duration). Typically, the Power swing un-blocking time setting is 2sec.

However, on detection of a line fault, the relay has to be de-blocked.

### **C. Placement of OOS trip Systems**

Out of step tripping protection (Standalone relay or built-in function of Main relay) shall be provided on all the selected lines. The locations where it is desired to split the system on out of step condition shall be decided based on system studies.

The selection of network locations for placement of OOS systems can best be obtained through transient stability studies covering many possible operating conditions. Based on these system studies, either of the option above may be adopted after the approval of Appropriate Sub-Committee of RPC.

While applying Power Swing Blocking (PSB) in the distance protection relay a few other important aspects also needs to be considered.

- PSB function should not block if negative sequence or zero sequence currents are present. Once blocked, the PSB should unblock if negative sequence or zero sequence currents are detected. Power Swing is a balanced three phase phenomenon and unbalance can only occur in the case of an asymmetrical fault.
- It will be desirable that during tenure of PSB, the distance protection is capable of detecting a fault and tripping. If such a feature is not available in the relay, PSB should be unblocked after a time delay, corresponding to the half cycle period of the slowest expected Swing Frequency (usually 2s corresponding to the slowest swing frequency of 0.25Hz is considered as default), to avoid the protection remaining perpetually blocked.

#### **1.4 Protection Coordination:**

A protection-coordination study shall be done to determine the trip settings of each protective device in the power system so that maximum protection with minimum interruption is provided for all faults that may happen in the system. System studies shall be conducted using computer- aided tools to assess the security of protection by finding out trajectory of impedance in various zones of distance relay under abnormal or emergency system condition on case-to-case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.

Relay coordination calculation module must consider the operating characteristics of the relays, normal operating and thermal or mechanical withstand characteristics of the equipment and must determine the optimum relay settings to achieve the protection objectives stated under Para 1.2.1.

In addition, the settings must be fine-tuned, simulating faults using Real Time Digital Simulator on case-to-case basis particularly for critical lines / corridors.

### **Part 1 (Requirements)**

The purpose is to ensure system protection is coordinated among operating entities. The Protection coordination requirement shall include the following:

- (1) Each Transmission Licensee, Load Dispatch Centre (LDC) and Generator Company shall keep themselves familiarized with the purpose and limitations of Protection System schemes applied in its area of control.
- (2) Each Transmission licensee shall coordinate its Protection System schemes with concerned transmission system, sub-transmission system and generators.
- (3) Each Generating Company shall coordinate its Protection System schemes with concerned transmission system and station auxiliaries.
- (4) Each Transmission Licensee and Generation Company shall be responsible for settings calculations for protection of elements under its ownership. It shall be the responsibility of the respective asset owner to obtain the inputs (adjacent line settings, infeed values etc.) from CTU/STU/RPC necessary for calculation of the settings.
- (5) CTU/STU shall provide the infeed values/latest network model to the requesting entity, within 15 days of receipt of such a request from the entity. The RPC shall provide the existing settings of the adjacent substations within 15 days of such a request from the requesting entity.
- (6) Each Generating Company and Transmission Licensee shall submit the protection settings along with the calculation sheets, co-ordination study reports and input data, in advance, to respective RPC for every new element to be commissioned. The mentioned information shall be submitted to the RPC by first week of each month for all the elements proposed to be commissioned in the following month.
- (7) The appropriate sub-committee of RPC shall review the settings to ensure that they are properly coordinated with adjacent system and comply with the existing guidelines. The onus to prove the correctness of the calculated settings shall lie with the respective Transmission licensee/Generation Company. In case, the sub-committee feels that the adjacent transmission system settings need to be changed, in view of the new element, it shall inform the concerned entity for revision of the existing settings.

- (8) If the RPC feels the need, it may recommend carrying out the dynamic study for the concerned system to ensure that the present settings are sufficient for maintaining the dynamic stability of the system. In such a case, on being directed by RPC, the respective CTU/STU shall carry out the necessary dynamic studies and submit the report to the RPC.
- (9) The appropriate sub-committee of RPC shall review and approve the settings based on the inputs/report submitted by the entities.
- (10) The approved settings shall be implemented by the entity and proper record of the implemented settings shall be kept. The modern numerical relays have several settings for various features available in the relay. It shall be ensured that only the approved features and settings are enabled in the relay. No additional protection/setting shall be enabled without the prior approval by respective RPC.
- (11) Each Transmission licensee and Generation Company shall co-ordinate the protection of its station auxiliaries to ensure that the auxiliaries are not interrupted during transient voltage decay.
- (12) Any change in the existing protection settings shall be carried out only after prior approval from the RPC. The owner entity shall inform all the adjacent entities about the change being carried out.
- (13) In case of failure of a protective relay or equipment failure, the Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall inform appropriate LDC. The Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall take corrective action as soon as possible.
- (14) Each Transmission Licensee shall coordinate Protection Systems on major transmission lines and interconnections with neighboring Generator Company, Transmission Licensee, and appropriate LDC.
- (15) Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company and Distribution Licensee shall monitor the status of each System Protection Scheme in their area, and shall inform to concerned RLDC about each change in status.

## **Part 2 (Measures of Compliance)**

The measures to be done for Protection coordination are as follows:

- (1) Each Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, revised fault analysis study, protection relay settings, notifications of changes, or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that there was coordination of their Protection System, new Protection System or changes in it.
- (2) Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company and Distributor shall have and provide upon request evidence that could include but is not limited to, documentation, electronic logs, computer printouts, or computer demonstration or other equivalent evidence that will be used to confirm that it monitors the System Protection Schemes in its area confirm and that it informed to concerned RLDC about changes in status of one of its System Protection Schemes.

## **2. Disturbance Monitoring and Reporting**

The Purpose is to ensure that adequate disturbance data is available to facilitate Grid event analysis. The analysis of power system disturbances is an important function that monitors the performance of protection system, which can provide information related to correct behavior of the system, adoption of safe operating limits, isolation of incipient faults, The Disturbance Monitoring Requirements Shall include the following:

- (1) Each Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall provide Sequence of Event (SOE) recording capability by installing Sequence of Event recorders or as part of another device, such as a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Remote Terminal Unit (RTU), a generator plants Digital (or Distributed) Control System (DCS) or part of Fault recording equipment.

This capability shall be provided at all substations and at locations to record all the events in accordance with CEA Grid Standard Regulation, 2010. The following shall also be monitored at each location:

- 1.1.1 Transmission and Generator circuit breaker positions

- 1.1.2 Protective Relay tripping for all Protection Groups that operate to trip circuit breakers identified in 1.1.1.

- 1.1.3 Tele protection keying and receive

- (2) In either case, a separate work station PC shall be identified to function as the event logger front end. The event logger work-station PC should be connected to UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply).

The event logger signals shall include but not limited to

- All Circuit Breaker and isolator switching Operations
- Auxiliary supply (AC, DC and DG) supervision alarms
- Auxiliary supply switching signals
- Fire-fighting system operation alarms
- Operation signals (Alarm/Trip from all the protection relays.)
- Communication Channel Supervision Signals.
- Intertrip signals receipt and send.
- Global Positioning System (GPS) Clock healthiness.
- Control Switching Device healthiness (if applicable).
- RTU/Gateway PC healthiness
- All Circuit Breaker Supervision Signals.
- Trip Circuit Supervision Signals.

- (3) Each Transmission Licensee shall provide Disturbance recording capability for the following Elements at facilities:

- 3.1 All transmission lines.

- 3.2 Autotransformers or phase-shifters connected to busses.

- 3.3 Shunt capacitors, shunt reactors.

- 3.4 Individual generator line interconnections.

- 3.5 Dynamic VAR Devices.

- 3.6 HVDC terminals.

- 3.7 Bus Bars

- (4) The Disturbance recording feature shall be enabled and configured in all the numerical relays installed.

- (5) Each Generator Company shall provide Disturbance recording capability for Generating Plants in accordance with the CEA Technical Standards for Connectivity and CEA Technical Standards for Construction of Plants.
- (6) Each Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall record for Faults, sufficient electrical quantities for each monitored Element to determine the following:
  - 6.1 Three phase-to-neutral voltages. (Common bus-side voltages may be used for lines.)
  - 6.2 Three phase currents and neutral currents.
  - 6.3 Polarizing currents and voltages, if used.
  - 6.4 Frequency.
  - 6.5 Real and reactive power.

The Minimum parameters to be monitored in the Fault record shall be specified by the respective RPC.
- (7) Each Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall provide Disturbance recording with the following capabilities:
  - 7.1 The data files shall be capable of being viewed, read, and analyzed with a generic COMTRADE analysis tool as per the latest revision of IEEE Standard C37.111.
  - 7.2 Each Fault record duration and the trigger timing shall be settable and set for a minimum 2 second duration including 300ms pre-fault time.
  - 7.3 Each Fault recorder shall have a minimum recording rate of 64 samples per cycle.
  - 7.4 Each Fault recorder shall be set to trigger for at least the following:  
Internal protection trip signals, external trigger input, analog triggering (any phase current exceeding 1.5 pu of CT secondary current or any phase voltage below 0.8pu, neutral/residual overcurrent greater than 0.25pu of CT secondary current).  
Additional triggers may be assigned as necessary.
- (8) Each Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall establish a maintenance and testing program for Disturbance Recorder (DR) that includes
  - 8.1 Maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
  - 8.2 Summary of maintenance and testing procedures.
  - 8.3 Monthly verification of communication channels used for accessing records remotely (if the entity relies on remote access and the channel is not monitored to a control center staffed around the clock, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7)).
  - 8.4 Monthly verification of time synchronization (if the loss of time synchronization is not monitored to a 24/7 control center).
  - 8.5 Monthly verification of active analog quantities.
  - 8.6 A requirement to return failed units to service within 90 days. If a Disturbance Recorder (DR) will be out of service for greater than 90 days, the Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall keep a record of efforts aimed at restoring the DR to service.
- (9) Each LDC, Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall share requisite data within 15 days upon request. Each LDC, Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall provide appropriate recorded disturbance data from DRs within 15 days of receipt of the request in each of the following cases:

- 9.1 CEA, RPCs/State, other LDC.
- 9.2 Request from other Transmission Licensee and Generator Company connected with Inter State Transmission System (ISTS).
- (10) Each Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall submit the data files to the appropriate RLDC conforming to the following format requirements:
  - 10.1 The data files shall be submitted in COMTRADE and PDF format.
  - 10.2 File shall have contained the name of the Relay, name of the Bay, station name, date, time resolved to milliseconds, event point name, status.The DR archives shall be retained for a period of three years.
- (11) A separate work-station PC, powered through UPS (Uninterrupted Power Supply) shall be identified with access to all the relays for extraction of DR. Auto-Download facility shall be established for automatic extraction of the DR files to a location on the work- station PC.
- (12) Time Sync Equipment
  - 12.1 Each substation shall have time synch equipment to synchronize all the numerical relays installed. Before any extension work, the capability of the existing Time-sync equipment shall be reviewed to ensure the synchronization of upcoming numerical relays.
  - 12.2 The status of healthiness of the time-sync device shall be wired as “Alarm” to SCADA and as an “Event” to Event Logger.
  - 12.3 The time synch status of all the installed numerical relays and event logger shall be monitored monthly and recorded. The Monthly records for relays not in time-sync shall be reported to appropriate RLDC and RPC. This record shall be archived for a period of three years by each concerned agency.
- (13) Disturbance Analysis and Reporting
  - 13.1 Subsequent to every tripping event, the concerned utility shall submit all the relevant DR files in COMTRADE and PDF format along with SOE, to the appropriate Load Dispatch Centre, regional power committee, Remote End Entity and the entity connected to the downstream of transformers (in case of transformer tripping).
  - 13.2 Each utility shall develop internal procedure of disturbance analysis. Necessary software shall be available with the entities to view and analyse the fault record files in COMTRADE and PDF format. The detailed analysis report shall identify the reason of fault, detailed sequence of events, mis-operations identified (if any), reason of protection mis- operation and corrective actions taken. Every entity shall submit the detailed analysis report within one week of the date of event occurrence, to the appropriate load dispatch center.
  - 13.3 A monthly report shall be prepared by each utility, mentioning the events of protection misoperations whose reasons could not be identified and require further follow-up. This report for each month shall be submitted to RPC and RLDC within the first week of the subsequent month.
  - 13.4 The detailed analysis reports shall be archived periodically. The archive shall be retained for a period of three years by each concerned agency.
  - 13.5 The analysis reports shall be discussed in the Appropriate Sub-Committee meetings of the RPC to be held periodically. The Appropriate Sub-Committee shall identify the lessons learnt during the events being discussed.

The Appropriate Sub-Committee shall scrutinize the correctness of operation of subject protection systems put in place by the concerned Constituents. It shall also recommend the appropriate remedial measures for system improvement.

- 13.6 Each RPC/RLDC shall develop and maintain a web based portal to act as a data repository with the facility for utilities to upload the fault records, analysis reports and protection relay settings.

### **3. Protection System Misoperation Reporting and Monitoring of Corrective Action:**

#### **(1) Definition of Misoperation:**

1. Any failure of a Protection System element to operate within the specified time when a fault or abnormal condition occurs within a zone of protection.
2. Any operation of a Protection System for a fault not within a zone of protection (other than operation as backup protection for a fault in an adjacent zone that is not cleared within a specified time for the protection for that zone).
3. Any unintentional Protection System operation when no fault or other abnormal condition has occurred unrelated to on-site maintenance and testing activity.

#### **(2) Objectives:**

1. Review all Protection System operations to identify the misoperations of Protection Systems.
2. Analyze misoperations of Protection Systems to identify the cause(s).
3. Develop and implement Corrective Action Plans to address the cause(s) of misoperations of Protection Systems.
4. Monitoring of implementation of corrective action plans.

#### **(3) Requirements**

1. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee that owns interrupting device that operated under the circumstances in Parts 1.1 through 1.3 shall, within 24 hours of the interrupting device operation, identify and report to respective SLDC/RLDC or NLDC whether its Protection System component(s) caused a Misoperation.
  - 1.1 The interrupting device operation was caused by a Protection System or by manual intervention in response to a Protection System failure to operate; and
  - 1.2 The interrupting device owner owns all or part of the Protection System; and
  - 1.3 The interrupting device owner identified that its Protection System component(s) caused the interrupting device(s) operation or was caused by manual intervention in response to its Protection System failure to operate.
2. When Protection System is shared among two or more utilities, each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee that owns an interrupting device that operated by protection system or by manual intervention in response to a protection system failure to operate, shall, within 24 hours of the interrupting device operation, provide information to the other utilities as well as respective SLDC/RLDC

or NLDC that share Misoperation identification responsibility for the Protection System under the following circumstances:

2.1 The interrupting device owner has determined that a Misoperation occurred or cannot rule out a Misoperation; and

2.2 The interrupting device owner has determined that its Protection System component(s) did not cause the interrupting device(s) operation or cannot determine whether its Protection System components caused the interrupting device(s) operation.

For an interrupting device operation by a Protection System component intended to operate as backup protection for a condition on another entity's Power System Element, information of the operation shall be provided to the other Protection System utilities for which that backup protection was provided.

3. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee that receives information, pursuant to Requirement 2 shall, within 48 hours of the interrupting device(s) operation, identify whether its Protection System component(s) caused a Misoperation.
4. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee that has not determined the cause(s) of a Misoperation, for a Misoperation identified in accordance with Requirement 1 or 3, shall perform investigative action(s) to determine the cause(s) of the Misoperation at least once in a month after the Misoperation was first identified, until one of the following completes the investigation. The duration of investigation shall not be more than 3 months from the date of misoperation.
  - The identification of the cause(s) of the Misoperation; or
  - A declaration that the operation is not misoperation.
5. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee that owns the Protection System component(s) that caused the Misoperation shall, within one month of first identifying a cause of the Misoperation:
  - Develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) along with the root cause analysis/ investigation report for the identified Protection System component(s), and an evaluation of the CAP's applicability to the entity's other Protection Systems including other locations and submit the same to RPCs; or
  - Explain in a declaration why corrective actions are beyond the entity's control or would not improve Grid reliability, and that no further corrective actions will be taken.
6. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee shall implement each CAP developed in Requirement 5, and update each CAP if actions or timetables change, until completed.
7. RPCs shall deliberate the reported misoperation in Appropriate Sub- Committee meetings and monitor the implementation of CAP.

#### **(4) Measures of Compliance:**

Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, and Distribution Licensee shall have dated evidence that demonstrates the followings:

1. It identified and reported the Misoperation of its Protection System component(s), if any, that meet the circumstances in Requirement 1 within the allotted time period.
2. It informed to the other owner(s), within the allotted time period for Requirement 2.

3. It identified whether its Protection System component(s) caused a Misoperation within the allotted time period for Requirement 3.
4. It performed at least one investigative action according to Requirement 4 at least once in a month until a cause is identified or a declaration is made.  
Acceptable evidence for Requirement 1,2,3 & 4 may include, but is not limited to the following dated documentation (electronic or hardcopy format): reports, databases, spreadsheets, emails, facsimiles, lists, logs, records, declarations, analyses of sequence of events, relay targets, Disturbance Recorder (DR) and Event Logger (EL) records, test results, or transmittals.
5. It developed a CAP and an evaluation of the CAP's applicability to other Protection Systems and locations, or a declaration in accordance with Requirement 5. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to the following dated documentation (electronic or hardcopy format): CAP and evaluation, or declaration.
6. It implemented each CAP, including updating actions or timetables. Acceptable evidence may include, but is not limited to the following dated documentation (electronic or hardcopy format): records that document the implementation of each CAP and the completion of actions for each CAP including revision history of each CAP. Evidence may also include work management program records, work orders, and maintenance records.
7. RPCs shall maintain the updates of implementation of CAP.

#### **4. Monitoring of System Protection Scheme (SPS) Misoperation:**

##### **(1) Definition of SPS Misoperation:**

SPS misoperations are defined as follows:

1. Failure to Operate – Any failure of a SPS to perform its intended function within the designed time when system conditions intended to trigger the SPS occurs;
2. Failure to Arm – Any failure of a SPS to automatically arm itself for system conditions that are intended to result in the SPS being automatically armed;
3. Unnecessary Operation – Any operation of a SPS that occurs without the occurrence of the intended system trigger condition(s);
4. Unnecessary Arming – Any automatic arming of a SPS that occurs without the occurrence of the intended arming system condition(s); and
5. Failure to Reset – Any failure of a SPS to automatically reset following a return of normal system conditions if that is the system design intent.

##### **(2) Objectives:**

1. Reporting of all System Protection Scheme (SPS) Misoperations
2. Analysis of all System Protection Scheme (SPS) Misoperations and/or
3. Mitigation of all System Protection Scheme (SPS) Misoperations.

##### **(3) Requirements:**

1. System Operational Personnel and System Protection personnel of the Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall analyze all SPS operations.

- 1.1. System Operational Personnel and System Protection Personnel shall report and review all SPS operations to RPCs/RLDCs/NLDC to identify apparent Misoperations within 24 hours.
- 1.2. System Protection Personnel shall analyze all operations of SPS within seven working days for correctness to characterize whether a Misoperation has occurred that may not have been identified by them.
2. Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall perform the following actions for each Misoperation of the SPS. If SPS actions that appear to be entirely reasonable and correct at the time of occurrence and associated system performance is fully compliant with IEGC/ CEA Standards the following requirements shall not be applicable. If the Transmission Licensee or Generator Company later finds the SPS operation to be incorrect through their analysis, the following requirements become applicable at the time the Transmission Licensee or Generator Company identifies the Misoperation:
  - 2.1. If there is an SPS Misoperation Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall repair and place back in service within 24 hours the SPS that misoperated. If this cannot be done, then
    - 2.1.1 Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall report to respective SLDC/RLDC or NLDC for necessary action to adjust generation and line flows to a reliable operating level.
    - 2.1.2 SLDC/RLDC/NLDC shall give instructions to concerned utilities to operate the facilities within permissible limits.
    - 2.1.3 Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall perform the instructions of SLDC/RLDC/NLDC as soon as they received and report back to respective SLDC/RLDC or NLDC for the implementation of the same.
3. Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall submit Misoperation incident reports to NLDC/RLDCs/RPCs within seven working days for the following.
  - 3.1. Identification of a Misoperation of a SPS,
  - 3.2. Completion of repairs or the replacement of SPS that misoperated.
4. SPS shall be reviewed at least once in a year or whenever any change in network/ modification.

**(4) Measures of Compliance:**

1. System Operational Personnel and System Protection personnel of the Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they reported and analyzed all SPS operations.
  - 1.1 Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they reviewed all operations of SPS within 24 hours.
  - 1.2 Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they analyzed all operations of SPS for correctness within seven working days.
2. Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they have repaired and replaced the SPS that misoperated from service within 24 hours following identification of the SPS Misoperation.
  - 2.1 The Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall have documentation describing all actions in accordance with Requirements 2.1.1 and 2.1.3. SLDC/RLDC/NLDC shall have the evidence in accordance with the Requirements 2.1.2.

3. Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they reported to NLDC/RLDCs/RPCs about the following within seven working days.
  - 3.1 Identification of all SPS Misoperations and corrective actions taken or planned.
  - 3.2 Completion of repair, replacement of, or SPS that misoperated.
4. Transmission Licensee and Generator Company shall have evidence that they reviewed SPS at least once in a year or whenever any change in network/ modification.

## **5. Transmission and Generation Protection System Maintenance and Testing**

### **(1) Definitions:**

1. **Protection System:** The Protection System includes Protection relays, associated communication system, System Protection Schemes, voltage and current sensing devices, DC control circuit, battery, circuit breakers & associated Trip Circuits etc. Protection relays shall also include Under Frequency Relays and Under Voltage Relays.
2. **Maintenance:** An ongoing program by which Protection System function is proved, and restored if needed. A maintenance program comprises verification of individual protection systems, which in turn is achieved by of a combination of monitoring, testing, and calibration.
3. **Testing:** Application of signals to a Protection System or component removed from service, to observe functional performance or output behavior.

### **(2) Objective:**

To ensure all transmission and generation Protection Systems affecting the Grid reliability are maintained and tested.

### **(3) Requirements:**

1. Each Transmission Licensee and each Generator Company that owns a generator interconnection Facility Protection System shall have a Protection System maintenance and testing program for Protection Systems that connected to Grid. The program shall include:
  - 1.1. Preventive maintenance and testing intervals and their basis.
  - 1.2. Summary of maintenance and testing procedures.
  - 1.3. Responsibilities of concerned wings of Licensee
2. Each Transmission Licensee and each Generator Company that owns a generator interconnection Facility Protection System shall provide documentation of its Protection System maintenance and testing program and the implementation of that program to the concerned RPCs as per the Table A. The documentation of the program implementation shall include:
  - 2.1. Evidence of Protection System devices were maintained and tested within the defined intervals.
  - 2.2. Date of each Protection System device was last tested/maintained.

**(4) Measures of Compliance:**

1. Each Transmission Licensee and each Generator Company that owns a generator interconnection Facility Protection System that affects the Grid reliability, shall have an associated Protection System maintenance and testing program as defined in Requirement 1.
2. Each Transmission Licensee and each Generator Company that owns a generator interconnection Facility Protection System that affects the Grid reliability, shall have evidence it provided documentation of its associated Protection System maintenance and testing program and the implementation of its program as defined in Requirement 2.
3. Retention of Records: The verification records for a particular protection system or component should be retained at least until successful completion should be retained for at least three years.

**TABLE A- Maximum Allowable Testing Intervals by Equipment Category**

Category	Component	Maximum verification interval		Verification Activities
		Unmonitored	Monitored	
1.	Testing and calibration of protective relays.	3 years	Continuous monitoring and verification	Test the functioning of relays with simulated inputs, including calibration. Verify that settings are as specified.
2.	Verification of Instrument transformer outputs and correctness of connections to protection system.	3 years	Continuous monitoring and verification	Verify the current and voltage signals to the protection system, and instrument transformer circuit grounding
3.	Verification of protection system tripping including circuit breaker tripping, auxiliary tripping relays and devices, lockout relays, telecommunications assisted tripping schemes, and circuit breaker status indication required for correct operation of protection system.	3 years	Continuous monitoring and verification	Perform trip tests for the whole system at once, and/or component operating tests with overlapping of component verifications. Every operating circuit path must be fully verified, although one check of any path is sufficient. A breaker only need be tripped once per trip coil within the specified time interval. Telecommunications-assisted line protection systems may be verified either by end-to-end tests, or by simulating internal or external faults with forced channel signals.

4.	Station battery supply	1 month	Continuous monitoring and verification	Verify voltage of the station battery once a month if not monitored.
5.	Protection system telecommunications equipment and channels required for correct operation of protection systems.	3 months	Continuous monitoring and verification	Check signal level, signal to noise ratio, or data error rate within the specified interval. This includes testing of any function that inhibits undesired tripping in the event of communications failure detected by partial or thorough monitoring. For partially or thoroughly monitored communications, verify channel adjustments and monitors not verified by telecommunications self-monitoring facilities (such as performance and adjustment of line tuners and traps in power line carrier systems). For thoroughly monitored systems, check for proper functioning of alarm notification.
6.	Testing and calibration of (Under Voltage Load Shedding) UVLS and (Under Frequency Load Shedding) UFLS relays that comprise a protection scheme distributed over the power system.	3 years	Continuous monitoring and verification	Test the functioning of relays with simulated inputs, including calibration. Verify that settings are as specified. Verification does not require actual tripping of loads.
7.	SPS, including verification of end-to-end performance, or relay sensing for centralized UFLS or UVLS systems.	1 year	Continuous monitoring and verification	Perform all of the verification actions for Categories 1 through 5 above as relevant for components of the SPS, UFLS or UVLS systems. The output action may be breaker tripping, or other control action that must be verified. A grouped output control action need be verified only once within the specified time interval, but all of the SPS, UFLS, or UVLS components whose operation leads to that control action must each be verified.

**Unmonitored** – Applies to electromechanical and analog solid-state protection systems.

**Monitored** – Applies to microprocessor relays and associated protection system components in which every element or function required for correct operation of the protection system is monitored continuously or verified, including verification of the means by which failure alarms or indicators are transmitted to a central location for immediate

action. For monitored systems or segments, documentation is required that shows how every possible failure, including a failure in the verification or monitoring system or alarming channel, is detected.

## **6. System Protection Scheme Review Procedure**

### **(1). Definition:**

A documented SPS review procedure to ensure that SPSs comply with Regional criteria and various Standards and Regulations.

### **(2). Objective:**

1. To ensure that all System Protection Schemes (SPS) are properly designed, meet performance requirements, and are coordinated with other protection systems.
2. To ensure that maintenance and testing programs are developed and misoperations are analysed and corrected.

### **(3). Requirements:**

1. Each RPC that uses or is planning to use an SPS shall have a documented SPS review procedure to ensure that SPSs comply with Regional criteria and various Standards and Regulations. The Regional SPS review procedure shall include:
  - 1.1. Description of the process for submitting a proposed SPS for RPC review.
  - 1.2. Requirements to provide data that describes design, operation, and modeling of an SPS.
  - 1.3. Requirements to demonstrate that the SPS are designed so that a single SPS component failure, when the SPS was intended to operate, does not prevent the power system elements from meeting the requirements Central Electricity Authority (Grid Standards) Regulations.
  - 1.4. Requirements to demonstrate that the inadvertent operation of an SPS shall meet the requirement of CEA's Transmission Planning Criterion as that required of the contingency for which it was designed.
  - 1.5. Requirements to demonstrate the proposed SPS will coordinate with other protection and control systems and applicable emergency procedures.
  - 1.6. Definition of mis-operation (in consistent with the definition mentioned in the item of these standards" Monitoring of System Protection Scheme (SPS) Mis-operation").
  - 1.7. Requirements for analysis and documentation of corrective action plans for all SPS mis-operations.
  - 1.8. Identification of the Subgroup at the regional level responsible for the SPS review procedure and the process for approval of the procedure.
  - 1.9. Determination, as appropriate, of maintenance and testing requirements.
2. The RPC shall provide other RPCs and CEA/NLDC with documentation of its SPS review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

### **(4). Measures of Compliance:**

1. The RPC using or planning to use an SPS shall have a documented review procedure as defined in Requirement 1.
2. The RPC shall have evidence it provided other RPCs and CEA/NLDC with documentation of its SPS review procedure on request (within 30 calendar days).

## 7. Transmission Relay Loadability

### (1). Definition:

Transmission Relay Loadability means the loading permitted in the transmission line by the relay including a security margin. The relay loadability is to be arrived in such a way as far as possible not to interfere with system operator actions, while allowing for short-term overloads, with sufficient margin to allow for inaccuracies in the relays and instrument transformers. Transmission relay do not prematurely trip the transmission elements out-of-service and allow the system operators from taking controlled actions consciously to alleviate the overload.

### (2). Objective:

Protective relay settings shall

1. Not limit transmission loadability;
2. Not interfere with system operators' ability to take remedial action to protect system reliability and;
3. Be set to reliably detect all fault conditions and protect the electrical network from these faults.
4. This standard includes any protective functions which could trip with or without time delay, on load current i.e. load responsive phase protection systems including but not limited to:
  - i. Phase distance.
  - ii. Out-of-step tripping.
  - iii. Switch-on-to-fault.
  - iv. Overcurrent relays.
  - v. Communications aided protection schemes including but not limited to:
    - Permissive overreach transfer trip (POTT).
    - Permissive under-reach transfer trip (PUTT).
    - Directional comparison blocking (DCB).
    - Directional comparison unblocking (DCUB).
  - vi. Phase overcurrent supervisory elements (i.e., phase fault detectors) associated with current based, communication-assisted schemes (i.e., pilot wire, phase comparison, and line current differential) where the scheme is capable of tripping for loss of communications.
5. The following protection systems are excluded from requirements of this standard:
  - i. Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail. For example:
    - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
    - Elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications except as noted in section 4 (vi)
  - ii. Protection systems intended for the detection of ground fault conditions.
  - iii. Protection systems intended for protection during stable power swings.
  - iv. Relay elements used only for System Protection Schemes.
  - v. Protection systems that are designed only to respond in time periods which allow 15 minutes or greater to respond to overload conditions.

- vi. Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings.
- vii. Relay elements associated with dc lines.
- viii. Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers.

**(3). Requirements:**

1. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee shall use any one of the following criteria for any specific circuit terminal to prevent its phase protective relay settings from limiting transmission system loadability while maintaining reliable protection of the Grid for all fault conditions. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee shall evaluate relay loadability at 0.90 per unit voltage and a power factor angle of 30 degrees.

Criteria:

- i. For Distance protection relays of transmission lines, the Zone-3 shall prevent load encroachment, considering the following criteria
  - a. Maximum load current ( $I_{max}$ ) may be considered as 1.2 times the thermal rating of the line or 1.5 times the associated bay equipment current rating (the Minimum of the bay equipment individual rating) whichever is lower. (The rating considered is approximately 15 minutes rating of the Transmission facility).
  - b. For setting angle for load blinder, a value of 30 degree may be adequate in most cases.
  - c. The Distance protection relays shall have provision for load blinder characteristic or load encroachment detection.
- ii. For Directional Overcurrent relays, wherever used in a transmission line (132kV level), the following shall be adopted.
  - a. An overload alarm shall be set at 110% of the thermal rating of the line with sufficient delay. This alarm shall allow the operator to take corrective action.
  - b. The Directional Overcurrent relay shall allow the line to carry 1.5 times of the associated line or bay equipment current rating (whichever is lower) till 10 minutes.
- iii. For transformer protection relays the following shall be adopted
  - Set the definite time transformer overload relay at 105% of the transformer ratings with sufficient delay. It shall be wired for alarm purpose only to allow the operator to take corrective action. No tripping shall be issued from this relay.
  - Set the transformer overload tripping at 110% of the transformer nameplate rating.
  - The back-up overcurrent relays shall use IDMT characteristics and be suitably coordinated with the upstream transmission network.
  - Install supervision for the transformer using either a top oil or simulated winding hot spot temperature element. The alarm and trip settings for these relays shall be set by individual entities based on the manufacturer's recommendation.
2. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee that uses thermal rating of circuit as described in above requirement may use the thermal ratings as specified in CEA's Manual on Planning Criterion.
3. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee which experience the load encroachment (despite setting the relay in accordance with this standard) or overloading of transmission line/ transformers, shall submit a report in this

regard to respective RPC within a month to allow the RPC to compile a list of all elements that have persistent overloading or load encroachment condition.

#### **(4). Measures of Compliance:**

1. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee shall have evidence such as spreadsheets or summaries of calculations to show that each of its transmission relays is set according to the standard and do not expose the transformer to fault levels and durations beyond those indicated in the standard.
2. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee shall have evidence such as rating spreadsheets or rating database to show that it used the thermal rating as per Requirement 2.
3. Each Transmission Licensee, Generator Company, or Distribution Licensee shall have evidence such as dated correspondence that it provided an updated list of the elements in accordance with the Requirement 3 of this standard. The updated list may either be a full list, a list of incremental changes to the previous list, or a statement that there are no changes to the previous list.

## **8. Relay Performance During Stable Power Swings**

### **(1). Definition:**

1. **Power Swing:** A variation in three phase power flow which occurs when the generator rotor angles are advancing or retarding relative to each other in response to changes in load magnitude and direction, line switching, loss of generation, faults, and other system disturbances.
2. **Stable Power Swing:** A power swing is considered stable if the generators do not slip poles and the system reaches a new state of equilibrium, i.e. an acceptable operating condition.
3. **Unstable Power Swing:** A power swing that will result in a generator or group of generators experiencing pole slipping for which some corrective action must be taken.

### **(2). Objective:**

1. To ensure that load-responsive protective relays are expected to not trip in response to stable power swings during non-Fault conditions.
2. This standard applies to the following protective functions including, but not limited to:
  - Phase distance
  - Phase overcurrent
  - Out-of-step tripping
  - Loss-of-field

The following protection functions are excluded from Requirements of this standard:

- Relay elements supervised by power swing blocking
- Relay elements that are only enabled when other relays or associated systems fail.  
For example:
  - Overcurrent elements that are only enabled during loss of potential conditions.
  - Relay elements that are only enabled during a loss of communications
- Thermal emulation relays which are used in conjunction with dynamic Facility Ratings
- Relay elements associated with direct current (dc) lines
- Relay elements associated with dc converter transformers

- Phase fault detector relay elements employed to supervise other load-responsive phase distance elements (i.e., in order to prevent false operation in the event of a loss of potential)
- Relay elements associated with switch-onto-fault schemes
- Reverse power relay on the generator
- Generator relay elements that are armed only when the generator is disconnected from the system, (e.g., non-directional overcurrent elements used in conjunction with inadvertent energization schemes, and open breaker flashover schemes)
- Current differential relay, pilot wire relay, and phase comparison relay
- Voltage-restrained or voltage-controlled overcurrent relays

**(3). Requirements:**

1. Each RPC shall, at least once each calendar year, provide information of generator, transformer, transmission line or other Grid element in its area that meets one or more of the following criteria, if any, to the respective Generator Company and Transmission Licensee:

Criteria:

- i. Generator(s) having an angular stability constraint that is addressed by a SPS and Elements of Associated Transmission System.
  - ii. Transmission elements having limitation due to angular stability limit and elements of Inter-regional and Inter-area importance.
  - iii. Elements that form the boundary of an island that are formed by tripping the Elements based on angular instability.
  - iv. Elements identified in the most recent Grid Disturbance/Grid Incidence where relay tripping occurred due to a stable or unstable power swing or the Elements identified in the most recent Planning system studies where relay tripping occurs due to a stable or unstable power swing during a simulated disturbance.
2. Each Generator Company and Transmission Licensee in consultation with CTU/STU and respective RLDC/RPC shall:
    - 2.1 Within 3 calendar months of notification of a Grid Element pursuant to Requirement 1, determine whether its load-responsive protective relay(s) applied to that Grid Element meets the following criteria.

**Criterion A:**

An impedance-based relay used for tripping is expected to not trip for a stable power swing, when the relay characteristic is completely contained within the unstable power swing region. The unstable power swing region is formed by the union of three shapes in the impedance (RX) plane; (1) a lower loss-of-synchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 0.7; (2) an upper loss-of-synchronism circle based on a ratio of the sending-end to receiving-end voltages of 1.43; (3) a lens that connects the endpoints of the total system impedance (with the parallel transfer impedance removed) bounded by varying the sending-end and receiving-end voltages from 0.0 to 1.0 per unit, while maintaining a constant system separation angle across the total system impedance where:

- i. The system separation angle is:
  - At least 120 degrees, or

- An angle less than 120 degrees where a documented transient stability analysis demonstrates that the expected maximum stable separation angle is less than 120 degrees.
- ii. All generation is in service and all transmission Grid Elements are in their normal operating state when calculating the system impedance.
- iii. Saturated (transient or sub-transient) reactance is used for all machines.

**Criterion B:**

The pickup of an overcurrent relay element used for tripping, that is above the calculated current value (with the parallel transfer impedance removed) for the conditions below:

- i. The system separation angle is:
    - At least 120 degrees, or
    - An angle less than 120 degrees where a documented transient stability analysis demonstrates that the expected maximum stable separation angle is less than 120 degrees.
  - ii. All generation is in service and all transmission Grid Elements are in their normal operating state when calculating the system impedance.
  - iii. Saturated (transient or sub-transient) reactance is used for all machines.
  - iv. Both the sending-end and receiving-end voltages at 1.05 per unit.
- 2.2 Within 3 calendar months of becoming aware of a generator, transformer, or transmission line Grid Element that tripped in response to a stable or unstable power swing due to the operation of its protective relay(s), determine whether its load-responsive protective relay(s) applied to that Grid Element meets the criteria A & B.

3. Each Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall, within 3 calendar months of determining a load-responsive protective relay does not meet the criteria A & B pursuant to Requirement 2, develop a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to meet one of the following:

- The Protection System meets the criteria A & B, while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping (if out-of-step tripping is applied at the terminal of the Grid Element); or
- The Protection System is excluded as mentioned in objective of this standard (e.g., modifying the Protection System so that relay functions are supervised by power swing blocking or using relay systems that are immune to power swings), while maintaining dependable fault detection and dependable out-of-step tripping (if out-of-step tripping is applied at the terminal of the Grid Element).

4. Each Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall implement each CAP developed pursuant to Requirement 3 and update each CAP if actions or timetables change until all actions are complete.

**(4). Measures of Compliance:**

1. Each RPC shall have dated evidence that demonstrates it provides the information of the generator, transformer, and transmission line/Grid Element(s) that meet one or more of the criteria in Requirement 1, if any, to the respective Generator Company and Transmission Licensee. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: emails, facsimiles, records, reports, transmittals, lists, or spreadsheets.
2. Each Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall have dated evidence that demonstrates the evaluation was performed according to Requirement 2. Evidence may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: apparent impedance

characteristic plots, email, design drawings, facsimiles, R-X plots, software output, records, reports, transmittals, lists, settings sheets, or spreadsheets.

3. The Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall have dated evidence that demonstrates the development of a CAP in accordance with Requirement 3.

4. The Generator Company and Transmission Licensee shall have dated evidence that demonstrates implementation of each CAP according to Requirement 4, including updates to the CAP when actions or timetables change.

Evidence in Measures 3 & 4 may include, but is not limited to, the following documentation: corrective action plans, maintenance records, settings sheets, project or work management program records, or work orders.

## **9. Time Synchronization:**

### **(1) Definition:**

Time/clock synchronization in Power system means to coordinate independent clocks with the reference to an accurate external time source, such as a GPS time signal.

*[Intelligent electrical devices (IEDs) have their own clocks, but electronic clocks are subject to drift. Even when updated frequently over a network by application software, their clocks may vary from each other by as much as a second. Because several events can occur during this time frame, modern power systems require more precise coordination to ensure high reliability]*

### **(2) Objective:**

1. To have precise time synchronization for a variety of Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs).
2. To have accurate time synchronization to ensure high reliability of power system
3. To have accurate time synchronization for proper fault analysis.
4. Time synchronization for substations with integrated protection and system control functions, as well as data collection require a target architecture that distributes synchronized time in several ways.

### **(3) Requirements:**

1. Each substation shall have time synchronization equipment including external time source to synchronize all the numerical relays installed. Before any extension work, the capability of the existing time synchronization equipment shall be reviewed to ensure the synchronization of upcoming numerical relays.
2. The status of healthiness of the time synchronization equipment shall be wired as “Alarm” to SCADA and as an “Event” to Event Logger.
3. The time synchronization status of all the installed numerical relays and event logger shall be monitored monthly and recorded.
4. The Monthly records for relays not in time synchronization shall be reported to concerned SLDC/RLDC and RPC. This record shall be archived for a period of three years by each concerned agency.
5. Remedial action shall be taken by the concerned substation/ Protection department immediately to make the relays in time synchronization with reference to external time source.
6. All the new Grid elements/Bay extension shall have accurate and precise Time synchronization equipment.

#### **(4) Measures of Compliance:**

1. Each substation shall have evidence that it reviewed the capability of the existing time synchronization equipment before any extension work for synchronization upcoming numerical relays.
2. Each substation shall review the status of healthiness of the time synchronization equipment being recorded.
3. Each substation shall have evidence that the time synchronization status of all the installed numerical relays and event logger are monitored monthly and recorded.
4. Each substation shall have evidence that the monthly records for relays not in time synchronization are reported to concerned SLDC/RLDC and RPC.
5. Each substation or concerned protection department shall have evidence that remedial action was taken to make the relays in time synchronization with reference to external time source.
6. Each entity, which has commissioned new Grid elements/Bay extension, shall have evidences that it has provided precise and accurate time synchronization equipment.

## **10. DC system**

### **(1) Definition:**

DC system consists of battery charger and battery sets. DC batteries are used to provide back up to control power supply to all the protection, control, communication and automation equipment for fail safe operation of the substation.

### **(2) Objective:**

To have the required capacity and to test the condition of DC system for a reliable, dependable and secured DC Power Supply Block and form essential part of the protection control, communication and automation equipment in the substation.

### **(3) Requirements:**

1. DC system shall comprise of Battery and a Battery Charger in parallel operation. In this mode, the charger shall be required to not only continuously feed a variable load but also deliver trickle/boost charging current for the battery at desired rate. Battery will be capable of feeding the DC load requirement of the Sub-station in case of failure of the charger. DC system at each voltage level shall have minimum of two sets of batteries. Each battery set shall cater 100% of its DC system load. One float-cum-boost charger shall be provided for each battery. Battery shall conform to relevant IS.
2. Each battery shall have sufficient capacity considering continuous and intermittent loads for the periods specified below and for all bays (i.e. present and future bays) with the charger out of service:
  - a) Continuous DC load for protection, control, indications, alarms and interlock for 10 hours.
  - b) Intermittent DC load for closing and tripping operation of Circuit Breakers, Isolators and Earth Switches. This load shall be determined considering simultaneous tripping of breakers on bus-bar protection for 220kV and above substations. Duration of intermittent load shall be considered as one minute.

3. Each utility shall carry out testing activities of Battery sets and Battery chargers as per procedures and periodicity as mentioned in the manufacturer's manual.

4. Each utility shall follow the maintenance schedules of DC system as given in Table.

**Table**

<b>Daily</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Checking of DCDB: P-E, N-E &amp; P-N voltage for earth fault in Main DCDBs.</li> <li>• Charger: Trickle/ Float charging Current(1.4mA/Ah for Lead Acid, &amp; 2.0mA/Ah for Ni-Cd): Adjustment if required to be done in Float voltage of the charger.</li> <li>• Checking of pilot cell* voltage (<math>2.25 \pm 0.02V</math> at 20-35degC for Lead Acid &amp; 1.4-1.42V for Ni-Cd).</li> <li>• Checking of pilot cell*specific gravity (not applicable for Ni-Cd&amp; VRLA) (Specific Gravity <math>1.200 \pm 0.005</math> at 27 degC)</li> </ul>
<b>Weekly</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Checking of Electrolyte level and any spillage / crack cells.</li> <li>• General appearance, cleanliness of the battery and battery area.</li> <li>• Any evidence of sulphation / corrosion at either terminals or connectors.</li> <li>• Battery Room: Condition of ventilation equipment.</li> <li>• Availability of tap water/safety shower in Battery room.</li> <li>• Ambient temperature to be recorded and maintained.</li> </ul>
<b>Monthly</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Charger output current and voltage recording and adjustment if required,</li> <li>• Voltage of each cell and total battery terminal voltage.</li> <li>• Checking for AC/DC mixing in DCDBs.</li> </ul>
<b>Quarterly</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Specific gravity of each cell (not applicable for Ni-Cd&amp; VRLA)</li> <li>• Temperature of electrolyte of representative cells.</li> </ul>
<b>Half yearly</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Boost Charging of battery sets for Ni-Cd battery only.</li> </ul>
<b>Yearly</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Batteries of all types: Capacity Test as per procedure of OEM for the installed battery type or IS14782 / IEEE 450 to be followed for lead acid and IEEE-1106 for Ni-Cd battery banks. The tightness of cell connections on individual terminals should be ensured.</li> <li>• Chargers: Load Test of chargers &amp; overhauling. Ripple Content measurement of chargers (3-4%). Record and compare with charger spec. If ripple is high, check &amp; rectify filters.</li> <li>• Overhauling of DCDB</li> </ul>

**Abbreviations:-**

- DCDB: DC Distribution Board
- P-E :Positive to Earth
- N-E :Negative to Earth
- P-N :Positive to Negative
- VRLA: Valve Regulated Lead Acid
- Ni-Cd :Nickel Cadmium
- Ah : Ampere hour

**(4). Measures of Compliance:**

1. Each utility shall have evidence as per Requirement 1.

2. Each utility shall have evidence that substation battery sets have sufficient capacity considering continuous, emergency and intermittent loads for the periods specified under Requirement 2.
3. Each utility shall keep the testing reports of charger and battery sets in substation at least for the duration of 3 years.
4. Each utility shall keep the evidence of maintenance schedules of DC system carried out according to the Requirement 4 at least for the duration of 3 years.

## **11. Compliance Monitoring of Reliability Standard for Protection system**

1. RPC shall be responsible for the compliance monitoring for Reliability Standard for Protection system.
2. The following methods shall be used to assess compliance:
  - (i) Self-certification (annually and submit to RPC)
  - (ii) Periodic Protection Audit (Conduct once in a year for critical substations as listed by RPC and once in four years for other substations according to schedule prepared by RPC)
  - (iii) Triggered Protection Audit (Conduct within 30 days for the substation where Grid Incident/ Disturbance occurred or complaint of noncompliance.)
3. The RPC shall constitute a Protection Audit team with representative of RPC / NPC Secretariat, CTU or POSOCO, STU/entity other than STU/entity being audited to assess compliance. The checklist for the protection audit shall be finalized in the appropriate subcommittee of RPC.
4. The review of the Protection Audit report shall be carried out in appropriate subcommittee of RPC.
5. The owner of the new transmission asset shall submit the Reliability Standard compliance certificate to respective SLDC/RLDC or NLDC for allowing the connection of the respective asset to the grid under intimation to RPC.
6. All the Transmission licensee, Generator Company and Distribution Licensee shall keep evidence to validate the compliance of the Reliability standard for Protection system and protection audit reports.
7. RPC shall keep all compliance monitoring reports/audit reports at least for five years.

## Annexure-D1

LINE NAME	TRIP DATE	TRIP TIME	RESTORATION DATE	RESTORATION TIME	Relay Indication LOCAL END	Relay Indication REMOTE END	Reason	Fault Clearance time in msec	DR/EL RECEIVED FROM LOCAL END	DR/EL RECEIVED FROM REMOTE END	Remarks
<b>Fault Clearing time violating protection standard</b>											
<a href="#">220KV SUBHASHGRAM(PG)-BANTALA-I</a>	04/09/2017	2:00	04/09/2017	3:12	Z2, RN,6.189KA, 15.60KM From Subhashgram	Tripped from Subashgram end only	R-N Fault	300 msec			WB informed that the fault was beyond Bantala
<a href="#">400KV ALIPURDUAR-BONGAIGAN-II</a>	15/09/2017	9:18	15/09/2017	9:46	R-N FAULT, zone 2	R-N FAULT, 10.69 KM, 3.9 KA	R-N FAULT	800 msec			
<a href="#">220KV STPS(WBSEB)-CHANDIL-I</a>	17/09/2017	12:09	17/09/2017	19:38	Y-B-N, Z-1	Y-b ph, z2, 99km, 1.5 kA	Y-B-N FAULT	1300 msec	Yes		A/R initiated at STPS end. JUSNL was advised to check the A/R scheme and PLCC.
<a href="#">132KV KhSTPP-SABOUR-I</a>	19/09/2017	9:25	19/09/2017	13:00	B-N, Z2		B-N Fault	400 msec			
<b>No autoreclose operation observed in PMU data</b>											
<a href="#">400KV KOLAGHAT-KHARAGPUR-II</a>	01/09/2017	11:10	01/09/2017	12:03	Z1,Y-ph, 88.5km, I fault=4.53KA	Z1,Y-ph, 14.31km,I fault=8.084KA	Y-N Fault	<100		Yes	Breaker problem at Kharagpur. The same has been rectified.
<a href="#">220KV BUDHIPADAR-RAIGARH-I</a>	03/09/2017	14:40	03/09/2017	15:40	B_N, 12.2 KM, Ib=4.24 KA	1.08 KA,B_N	B-N Fault	< 100			PLCC is not available
<a href="#">220KV MADHEPURA-NEW PURNEA-I</a>	05/09/2017	16:34	05/09/2017	17:15	B_N, F.D. 57.6 KM, F.C. 1.09 KA	B_N,F.D. 34.48 KM, F.C. 3.99 KA	B-N Fault	< 100			A/R out of service at Madhepura
<a href="#">220KV JODA-RAMCHANDRAPUR-SC</a>	06/09/2017	12:32	06/09/2017	12:59	Y_N,F.C. 3.32 KA, F.D. 18.69 KM		Y-N Fault	< 100			PLCC is not available
<a href="#">220KV BIDHANNAGAR-WARIA-II</a>	07/09/2017	12:38	07/09/2017	13:12	B_N,F.C. 4.57 KA, F.D. 13.21 KM	B_N, Zone I	B-N Fault	< 100			PLCC is not available
<a href="#">220KV MAITHON-DHANBAD-II</a>	07/09/2017	15:02	07/09/2017	15:55	YN,4 .847KA, 32.02 KM	YN, 4.64KA, 4.64 KM	Y-N Fault	< 100			A/R not healthy at Maithon. It will be rectified.
<a href="#">400KV BINAGURI-ALIPURDUAR-I</a>	08/09/2017	16:47	08/09/2017	17:05	B-N ,59 KM, 3.2 KA	B-N, 74 KM, 2.24 KA, A/R SUCCESSFUL	B-N Fault	< 100	Yes		A/R not initiated due to PLCC problem at Binauri. The same been rectified.
<a href="#">220KV ALIPURDUAR-SALAKATI-I</a>	08/09/2017	23:23	09/09/2017	0:00	Y_N, Z II, 100.6 KM, 1.394 KA	Y_N, 3.495 KA, F.C 9.894 KA;A/R successful	Y-N Fault	< 100			PLCC problem at Salakati. Problem has been rectified.
<a href="#">400KV MENDHASAL-PANDIABIL-I</a>	12/09/2017	14:58	12/09/2017	15:47	Y_N,F.D. 21.7 KM, F.C. 7.02 KA	Y_N, F.D. 5 KM, F.C. 5.7 KA (A/R successful)	Y-N Fault	< 100			PLCC problem at Mendhasal. Problem has been rectified.
<a href="#">400KV BARIPADA-TISCO-SC</a>	12/09/2017	16:47	12/09/2017	17:32	R_N Fault,F.C. 7KM, F.D. 9.35 KA	A/R successful	R-N Fault	< 100			DT recieved at Baripada while working on PLCC at remote end.
<a href="#">400KV MAITHON-RAGHUNATHPUR-I</a>	12/09/2017	16:59	12/09/2017	17:38	B_N		B-N FAULT	< 100			DT sent during LBB operation. Contacted ABB for rectification.
<a href="#">220KV ALIPURDUAR-SALAKATI-II</a>	13/09/2017	18:40	13/09/2017	19:33	Y_N,Z I, F.D. 95.1 KM, F.C. 1.3KA		Y-N Fault	< 100			PLCC problem at Salakati. Problem has been rectified.
<a href="#">220KV ALIPURDUAR-SALAKATI-I</a>	13/09/2017	19:01	13/09/2017	19:33	R_N,Z II, F.D. 83.9 KM, F.C. 1.3 KA		R-N Fault	< 100			PLCC problem at Salakati. Problem has been rectified.
<a href="#">220KV MUZAFFARPUR-HAJIPUR-II</a>	14/09/2017	11:56	14/09/2017	12:22	Z-2, B-N, F/D: 43.99KM, F/C-3.186KA		B-N FAULT	< 100	Yes		A/R not in service at Hazipur
<a href="#">220KV FSTPP-LALMATIA-I</a>	16/09/2017	10:55	16/09/2017	13:22	B-ph, z1, 73.62 km, 1.5 KA		B-N Fault	< 100	Yes		A/R not in service at Lalmatia
<a href="#">220KV FSTPP-LALMATIA-I</a>	17/09/2017	4:05	17/09/2017	21:58	R_N Fault		R_N Fault	< 100	Yes		A/R not in service at Lalmatia
<a href="#">220KV PATNA-KHAGAIL-SC</a>	17/09/2017	10:27	17/09/2017	12:22		B-N , Z-1 , F/D 13 km	B-N Fault	< 100	Yes		A/R not in service at Khagail
<a href="#">220KV MUZAFFARPUR-HAJIPUR-I</a>	21/09/2017	9:28	21/09/2017	10:59	B_N,43.91 KM,3.196 KA ZONE 2	13 KM ,ZONE 1,3.07 KA	B-N Fault	150 msec	Yes		A/R not in service at Hazipur
<a href="#">400KV KHARAGPUR-KOLAGHAT-I</a>	21/09/2017	14:33	21/09/2017	15:10	R_N, F.D. 59.3 KM, F.C. 3.77 KA	R_N,F.D. 15.26 KM, F.C. 8.62 KA	R-N Fault	< 100	Yes		BPL carrier will be changed at Kharagpur
<a href="#">220KV JAMSHEDPUR-JINDAL-SC</a>	23/09/2017	11:54	23/09/2017	12:15		B_N, 101 KM,1.349 KA	B-N Fault	< 100			PLCC is not available
<a href="#">220KV BIRPARA-MALBASE-SC</a>	25/09/2017	3:17	25/09/2017	3:56	B-N , 28 km , 3.5 KA	Line seems a/r successful at Malbase end	B-N Fault	< 100			A/R not in service at Malbase
<a href="#">220KV JAMSHEDPUR-JINDAL-SC</a>	25/09/2017	11:32	25/09/2017	12:01	Z-I, YN		Y-N Fault	< 100			PLCC is not available
<a href="#">400KV RANCHI-RAGHUNATHPUR-II</a>	27/09/2017	16:26	27/09/2017	17:18	No tripping	DT recieved, zone 3 pickup	B-N Fault	< 100			
<a href="#">400KV RANCHI-RAGHUNATHPUR-III</a>	27/09/2017	16:26	27/09/2017	17:17	No tripping	DT recieved, zone 3 pickup	B-N Fault	< 100			
<a href="#">400KV KHARAGPUR-KOLAGHAT-I</a>	28/09/2017	11:27	28/09/2017	11:48	Bph, Z1, 52.9km, If=3.94kA	Autoreclose successful ,Bph, Z1	B-N Fault	< 100	Yes		Carrier failure at Kharagpur

<a href="#">220KV MAITHON-DHANBAD-II</a>	28/09/2017	18:50	28/09/2017	19:30		R_N, Zone I, F.D. 29.03 KM, F.C. 4.09 kA	R-N Fault	< 100			A/R not healthy at Maithon. It will be rectified.
<a href="#">400KV RANCHI-ROURKELA-I</a>	29/09/2017	16:07	29/09/2017	16:49	Y_N, 93.23 KM, 4.09 kA, A/R Successful	Y_N, 21.22 KM, 9.14 kA	Y-N Fault	< 100			Static relay was replaced recently, due to wiring problem A/R not operated. The same has been rectified.

**Miscellaneous: Tripping on DT, No reason furnished**

<a href="#">400KV PATNA-KISHANGANJ-I</a>	01/09/2017	11:03	01/09/2017	11:55	DT Received	Maloperation of O/V Stage I at Kishanganj	O/V Stage I at Kishanganj				
<a href="#">220KV BARIKADA-BALASORE-II</a>	05/09/2017	11:30	05/09/2017	12:40		Tripped from Balasore end only					EM type backup E/F relay maloperation
<a href="#">132KV RIHAND-GARWAH-I</a>	14/09/2017	11:52	14/09/2017	15:20	Tripped from Rihand end only		Tripped from Rihand end				
<a href="#">400KV MALDA-NEW PURNEA-I</a>	14/09/2017	18:54	14/09/2017	19:05	Did Not tripped	DT received	DT received at N Purnea				
<a href="#">400KV GMR-ANGUL-II</a>	15/09/2017	18:18	15/09/2017	19:20		DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL	DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL				
<a href="#">400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II</a>	16/09/2017	16:11	16/09/2017	22:01	O/V (MAL-OPERATION)	DT RECEIVED	O/V AT BSF (MAL-OPERATION)		Yes		
<a href="#">400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II</a>	16/09/2017	22:46	17/09/2017	2:37	Faulty O/V Relay Oprn		O/V Relay Oprn				
<a href="#">220KV RENGALI(PH)-RENGALI-II</a>	17/09/2017	23:58	18/09/2017	6:48	Tripped from Rengali(PH) end only.		Tripped from Rengali(PH) end only.				
<a href="#">400KV PATNA-BALIA-I</a>	22/09/2017	11:50	22/09/2017	12:43	Tripped from Patna end only						Aux relay failed contact shorted. The same has been replaced.
<a href="#">132KV RIHAND-GARWAH-I</a>	22/09/2017	19:12	22/09/2017	20:40	Tripped from Rihand						
<a href="#">400KV MEERAMUNDALI-ANGUL-II</a>	23/09/2017	21:23	23/09/2017	21:53	DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL	CB REMAIN CLOSED AT MEERAMANDALI	DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL				DT initiated due to control cable problem
<a href="#">400KV MEERAMUNDALI-ANGUL-II</a>	23/09/2017	22:20	23/09/2017	22:34	DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL		DT RECEIVED AT ANGUL				DT initiated due to control cable problem
<a href="#">400KV KODERMA-BOKARO-II</a>	27/09/2017	15:31	27/09/2017	16:18	Over Voltage	DT RECEIVED	Over Voltage				Over voltage at both ends
<a href="#">400KV GORAKHPUR-MOTIHARI-II</a>	27/09/2017	21:27	27/09/2017	22:33	D/T Received	No indication	DT received at Gorakhpur				

# OVER VOLTAGE ISSUE AT BIHARSHARIFF


MALOPERATION OF O/V RELAY AND  
ALARMING HEALTHY PHASE VOLTAGE  
RISE IN PMU DURING SINGLE PHASE  
FAULT

# LIST OF TRIPPING IN THE LAST FEW MONTH


400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II	05-08-17	13:44	05-08-17	20:44	Tripped on O/v from Biharsharif end (Mal-operation, voltage at Biharsharif-410KV).DT received at New Purnea
400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II	11-08-17	17:52	11-08-17	18:17	DT RECEIVED AT PURNEA END
400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II	16-09-17	16:11	16-09-17	22:01	O/V AT BSF (MAL-OPERATION)
400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II	16-09-17	22:46	17-09-17	2:37	Faulty O/V Relay Oprn
400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II	19-09-17	12:31	19-09-17	13:02	B-N,z-1 , f/d-168 km , f/c-2.6ka
400KV BIHARSARIFF-MUZAFFARPUR-I	06-07-17	14:12	06-07-17	15:12	Y-N, F/C 9.7 kA, 14.44 km from MZF
400 KV BIHARSHARIFF - SASARAM - I	15.04.17	15:02	15.04.17	15:23	R-N, Z-I, F/C 4.12 KA, 86.07 KM from BSF
400KV MUZAFFARPUR(PG)-BIHARSARIFF-I	30-06-17	17:31	30-06-17	21:29	Y-N FAULT

# 400KV BIHARSARIFF-LAKHISARAI-II TRIPPING ON O/V ON 16-09-17 AT 16:11 AND 22:46 HRS

- Tripped on over voltage but system voltage was normal as per PMU




# OBSERVATION FROM DR



B-phase voltage waveform is distorted and that is triangular like wave form. In the next slide harmonic content of this is shown

# CONT...



Continuously Harmonic content was **much above acceptable standards** before the tripping took place . Specially the triplen harmonics of 3<sup>rd</sup> and 21<sup>th</sup> order.

# CEA GRID STANDARDS

**3.(2) --The transmission licensee shall ensure that the voltage wave-form quality is maintained at all points in the Grid by observing the limits given in Table 5 below,-**

<b>S.No.</b>	<b>System Voltage (kV rms)</b>	<b>Total Harmonic Distortion (%)</b>	<b>Individual Harmonic of any particular Frequency (%)</b>
1	765	1.5	1.0
2	400	2.0	1.5
3	220	2.5	2.0
4	33 to 132	5.0	3.0

# IEEE Std 519™-2014, IEEE Recommended Practice and Requirements for Harmonic Control in Electric Power Systems

Bus voltage at PCC	Individual voltage distortion (%)	Total voltage distortion THD (%)
69 kV and below	3.0	5.0
69.001 kV through 161 kV	1.5	2.5
161.001 kV and above	1.0	1.5

*Note: High-voltage systems can have up to 2.0% THD where the cause is an HVDC terminal that will attenuate by the time it is tapped for a user.*

# EFFECT OF HARMONICS

- We know harmonics could be responsible for mal operation of CB, relay and metering device in power system.
- 3<sup>rd</sup> harmonics lead to neutral current and voltage. In this case we see residual voltage of 66 kV is appearing in the neutral of Lakhisarai line with 61 % 3<sup>rd</sup> harmonic content.

# EFFECT OF HARMONICS

- Now in few DP relay( REL 670) there is over voltage protection function for residual neutral voltage : **PTOV, 59N** . So we need to check **whether that was disabled or not.** POWERGRID may confirm.
- Other use of residual neutral voltages are: **VT supervision, Directional decision for DEF.**
- So chance of wrong operation of the above function can not be overruled.

# Other threats





Fig.2.6: Example of relative transformation ratio of a 220kV CVT [22]

As shown in Fig.2.6, the CVT has a severe response fluctuation. **A resonance occurs near 150Hz**, which is caused by the coupling of the capacitive divider and the inductive step down transformer of the CVT. As indicated in the graph, the frequency bandwidth of the CVT is less than 100Hz with the consideration of 5% accuracy.

# 400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II TRIPPING ON O/V ON 05-08-17 AT 13:44 hrs

- Tripped on over voltage but system voltage was normal as per PMU . DR is as follows :




Suddenly voltage of C-phase disappear and Fuse failure function of CVT rightly activated . But though there was no fault in the system and no change in current still **other two phase voltage shoot up** . And o/v stage two operated.

400KV NEW PURNEA-BIHARSARIFF-II  
TRIPPING ON O/V ON 05-08-17 AT 13:44 hrs

- Why are voltage of C phase disappear ?  
POWERGRID may explain .
- Why the voltage of other two phase shoot up?  
While there was no voltage rise in the system  
as clear from Biharshariff PMU . Is it CVT  
problem of that particular line ? Then what  
could be its cause. POWERGRID may explain


# RISE OF HEALTHY PHASE VOLTAGE DURING SLG FAULT

PMU PLOTS OF SUCH HIGH VOLTAGES DURING SLG FAULT AT BIHARSHARIFF PMU ARE AS FOLLOWS:




On 17.05.2017 at 15:05:14 hrs. 400 KV Biharshariff-Varanasi-I

# CONT..



Disturbance at Biharshariff on 09-07-17 at 14:49 hrs.

# CONT..



Disturbance at Biharshariff on 25-09-17 at 09:32 hrs.

In almost all the cases of SLG faults near Biharshariff some voltage rise in healthy phases are observed in Biharshariff PMU. For the above cases rise of voltage are **alarmingly high**. In our PSCAD study we have seen that for  $Z0/Z1$  of 5 and more may cause healthy phase voltage rise up to 1.5 PU.

# ACTION NEEDED

- Identification of sources of such high harmonic content at Biharshariff-Lakhisarai line voltage at CVT secondary.
- Checking the healthiness of all CVTs at Biharshariff and identify any source of error. For that transient study in PSCAD will be helpful. So POWERGRID may submit details of CVT for modeling.
- Checking the healthiness of earthing system at Biharshariff s/s.